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Modern Forfeiture Law: The Symbolic
Function of Legal Actions Against
Objects
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In 1996 the Supreme Court issued two opinions, Bennis v.
Michigan1 and United States v. Ursery,2 emphasizing the
constitutionality of civil forfeiture schemes under both the Due
Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
* Associate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. I wish to thank Laura
Dickinson, Bill Nelson, John Owens, and Silvija Strikis for helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this Article. I note that, although I served as law clerk to Associate Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg of the United States Supreme Court during the 1997 Term, I was not working at the
Court when the two cases discussed in this Article—Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996),
and United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996)—were decided, and I have not discussed the
rationale behind these decisions with Justice Ginsburg. Thus, the analysis in this Article should
not in any way be construed as an “inside” account.
1. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
2. 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
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These decisions, and civil forfeiture schemes generally, have faced
strong criticism from scholars and civil libertarians. Critics point out
that law enforcement agencies “perpetrate astonishing outrages on
owners of private property through forfeitures,”3 and they argue that
civil forfeiture runs afoul of any number of constitutionally-based
guarantees, from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement4 to
the Eighth Amendment’s concept of proportional punishment.5
Among the arguments advanced against civil forfeiture has been
one based on its origins. The so-called “legal fiction” underlying
forfeiture is that the government is acting against the property itself,
rather than against the owner. Commentators have traced this fiction
to the Middle Ages. Under the law of the deodand, an inanimate
object that caused a death was deemed to be “guilty” of a crime and
therefore was offered to God through forfeiture to the King. Those
opposed to today’s forfeiture laws have seized upon this history to
demonstrate the supposedly senseless origins of forfeiture. “Implicit
in this discussion is the absurdity of perpetuating a system that
attributed evil to an ox, a tree, a boat, and a broadsword.”6
The Supreme Court also has invoked the history of civil forfeiture,
but for a different purpose. Although the Court has sometimes
acknowledged that the fiction underlying civil forfeiture may seem
unfair, it has nevertheless upheld forfeiture schemes based on the
historical prevalence and acceptance of the practice. For example, in
one of this century’s early forfeiture cases, the Court concluded that,
“whether the reason for [the challenged forfeiture scheme] be
artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial
jurisprudence of the country to be now replaced.”7 In a later case, the
Court also upheld a forfeiture, explicitly referring to the law of the
deodand.8 And in both Bennis and Ursery, the Court cited “a long
and unbroken line of cases,”9 dating back to “the earliest years of
this Nation,”10 to support its conclusions. This unbroken line of cases,
3. LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 1 (1996).
4. See, e.g., Amy D. Ronner, Prometheus Unbound: Accepting a Mythless Concept of Civil
In Rem Forfeiture with Double Jeopardy Protection, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 655, 673-74 (1996)
(discussing the “downright oppressive” nature of 21 U.S.C. § 881 (one of the federal forfeiture
statutes), and noting that warrantless searches are permitted under the statute and its
attendant rules and procedures).
5. See, e.g., Catherine Cerna, Economic Theory Applied to Civil Forfeiture: Efficiency and
Deterrence Through Reallocation of External Costs, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1939, 1940 (1995)
(arguing the disproportionality, for example, of the 1991 forfeiture of a home where police
discovered 354 marijuana plants, grown for the owner’s private use and having a market value
of only $137.50).
6. Leslie A. Hakala, Book Note, Opposing Forfeiture, 106 YALE L.J. 1319, 1320 (1997).
7. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921).
8. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing, 416 U.S. 663, 680-82 (1974).
9. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 446.
10. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 274.
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by most accounts, derived its forfeiture rules from the English
common law of the deodand.11
Although both the critics and the Court have used the history of
forfeiture actions to support their conclusions, neither side has made
any serious attempt to understand this history. By attacking
forfeiture practice in the Middle Ages as an archaic and nonsensical
custom, critics make no effort to see the law of the deodand within
its cultural context. And by simply invoking historical precedent as a
talismanic answer to today’s judicial riddles, the Court fails to
provide any analysis of how that precedent might be justified.12
This Article seeks to offer a more nuanced view of this history.
The evidence suggests that, throughout the medieval period, legal
actions against both inanimate objects and animals were widespread.
Indeed, it appears that the origin of such trials extends as far back as
ancient Greece. Although it would be impossible to discover with
any certainty the reasons for this seemingly irrational practice, by
examining it more closely, we may see that these legal actions
11. See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 n.5 (1998); Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602, 611-18 (1993); Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-83; United States v. United
States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 720 (1971); OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
23-33 (Mark D. Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881); Jimmy Gurule, Introduction: The
Ancient Roots of Modern Forfeiture Law, 21 J. LEGIS. 155, 156 (1995) (“The conceptual
underpinnings of civil forfeiture can be traced back to English common law.”). Several authors
have argued that modern forfeiture law actually arises from admiralty and not deodands. See
GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 484 (1957); Donald J.
Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Innocence Lost: Bennis v. Michigan and the Forfeiture Tradition,
61 MO. L. REV. 593, 601-02; James R. Maxeiner, Bane of American Forfeiture Law—Banished
at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768, 771 (1977). However, given that the law of deodands did
exist in the American colonies, see infra text accompanying notes 177-81, and given that both
deodands and admiralty law conceptualize the object as a guilty party subject to seizure, it is
difficult to determine with any certainty which tradition gave rise to modern forfeiture
practice. Moreover, because the two traditions use the same “guilty property” narrative, the
distinction makes little difference for the purpose of this Article.
12. Unfortunately, the decisions in Bennis and Ursery are not at all anomalous in this
regard. “The case reporters are replete with . . . decisions upholding the constitutionality of
civil forfeiture statutes based merely on the recognition that they have always been permitted
in the past.” Robert Lieske, Civil Forfeiture Law: Replacing the Common Law with a Common
Sense Application of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 21 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 265, 267 (1995). See, e.g., Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680 (finding the civil forfeiture at
issue constitutional because “[t]he historical background of forfeiture statutes in this country
and this Court’s prior decisions sustaining their constitutionality lead to that conclusion”);
Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 224 (1945) (“Such personification of the
vessel, treating it as a juristic person whose acts and omissions, although brought about by her
personnel, are personal acts of the ship for which, as a juristic person, she is legally responsible,
has long been recognized by this Court.”); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 468 (1926) (“It
has long been settled that statutory forfeiture[] of property . . . is not a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States,
254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921) (stating that civil forfeitures are “too firmly fixed in the punitive and
remedial jurisprudence of this country to now be displaced”); United States v. Campos, 859
F.2d 1233, 1240 (6th Cir. 1988) (“After analysis of the historical background and development
of the law of forfeiture, innocence of the owner of property was rejected as a defense to
forfeiture despite the hardship involved.”); Associates Investment Co. v. United States, 220
F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 1955) (“[I]t is well settled that [forfeiture] is not a denial of due process
of law, or a taking of property for public use without fair compensation.”).
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performed social functions for the community that are not
necessarily so different from the function of modern forfeiture law.
Thus, it is a mistake to dismiss the practice of trying inanimate
objects or animals as the unenlightened custom of a bygone era.13
Rather, by drawing on scholarship in anthropology and literary
criticism, I argue that such legal proceedings permitted the
community to heal itself after the breach of a social norm by creating
a narrative14 whereby a symbolic transgressor of the established
13. See Nicholas Humphrey, Foreword to E.P. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS at xix (Faber & Faber 1988) (1906):
We must be wary of . . . assuming that people of mediaeval Europe were so different
from ourselves that it is not worth applying any of the standards of rationality we have
today. . . . [T]o suggest, for example, that the grown-up people involved really could not
tell the difference between animals and human beings, cannot be right. Other people
may be other, but they are not necessarily stupid.
There can be no doubt that medieval society was fundamentally different from our own and
that people in medieval times may have had a fundamentally different view of the world, the
community, and the individual. See generally JOHAN HUIZINGA, THE WANING OF THE
MIDDLE AGES (1954). These differences may account for some of the seemingly eccentric legal
customs of that era. Nevertheless, particularly because our modern law of forfeiture derives
from this period, it makes little sense simply to dismiss the ancient practice out of hand.
Rather, an attempt to understand the cultural roles these proceedings may have performed
permits us to question seriously whether such roles are still vestigially present in our own
customs.
14. I use the word narrative in a broad sense to describe any type of explanatory
framework for describing reality. Over the past several decades, anthropologists, literary
critics, and legal scholars have increasingly studied the role of narratives in structuring our
experience of the world. See, e.g., THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF EXPERIENCE (Victor W. Turner &
Edward M. Bruner eds., 1986) (collecting essays exploring the relationship between experience
and narratives used to describe experience); ROLAND BARTHES, Introduction to the Structural
Analysis of Narratives, in IMAGE—MUSIC—TEXT 79 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977) (using
linguistics to construct, describe, and classify a theory of narratives); VINCENT CRAPANZANO,
TUHAMI: PORTRAIT OF A MOROCCAN (1980) (exploring conflicting storytelling styles between
anthropologist and subject); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri C. Spivak
trans., 1974) (drawing on the work of linguist Ferdinand de Saussure to argue that language
provides no direct access to reality and therefore what we call “reality” is really a set of
narrative conventions); CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, The Effectiveness of Symbols, in
STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 186 (Claire Jacobson & Brooke G. Schoepf trans., 1963)
(describing the use of narratives to encapsulate pain); RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE AND
TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1989) (advocating that social science
acknowledge the role of conflicting narratives and subjectivity in descriptions of reality); Peter
Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW’S STORIES 14, 14 (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., 1996) (“Narrative appears to be one of our large, all-pervasive ways of organizing
and speaking the world—the way we make sense of meanings that unfold in and through
time.”); Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) (arguing that
“[n]o set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and
give it meaning”); Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in
ON NARRATIVE 1, 2 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1981) (finding that “[n]arrative is a metacode, a
human universal on the basis of which transcultural messages about the nature of a shared
reality can be transmitted”). Narratives are now seen as encompassing almost any form of
social discourse and not just traditional narrative forms, such as folktales. See, e.g., BARTHES,
supra, at 79:
The narratives of the world are numberless. Narrative is first and foremost a prodigious
variety of genres. . . . [U]nder this almost infinite diversity of forms, narrative is present
in every age, in every place, in every society; it begins with the very history of mankind
and there nowhere is nor has been a people without narrative.
The focus on narratives allows critics to study how the vessel by which we impart social
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order was deemed to be “guilty” of a “crime” and cast beyond the
boundaries of the society. I then suggest that at least some aspects of
modern civil forfeiture law may fulfill a similar function. Indeed, the
importance of this symbolic aspect of civil forfeiture may provide a
way of thinking about the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence in
this area.
My analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes the Court’s
decisions in Bennis and Ursery and surveys some of the criticisms of
those decisions and of modern forfeiture law generally. This
discussion reveals that, despite the references to history, neither side
in the forfeiture debate has attempted seriously to understand the
practice of taking legal action against non-human perpetrators or to
explore how that practice might still be relevant today. Part II traces
the history of such legal actions from antiquity to medieval and early
modern England and Europe, and suggests that these legal
proceedings created a societal ritual15 for removing a transgressor
from the community to expiate a wrong. Significantly, for the
purpose of these actions, it appears to have been irrelevant whether
or not the owner of the offending object was guilty. Indeed, the
actions against objects were considered completely separate from
any civil or criminal actions that might be taken against the owner.
Finally, Part III attempts to link these historical proceedings with
modern forfeiture law. Still today, a forfeiture proceeding can serve
to remove an offensive symbol of wrongdoing from the community,
thereby fulfilling a social function that is quite different from the
desire to punish the culpable individual who may have used the
object in question.
Certainly our society may continue to seize objects for a variety of
reasons distinct from the symbolic function I discuss. For example, it
has often been argued (both historically and in modern times) that
knowledge—conversational forms, gestures, news items—itself constitutes our apprehension of
reality.
15. The term “ritual” will be used throughout this Article to mean a formal, socially
standardized, and repetitive action wrapped in a web of symbolism that serves to channel
emotion, define experience, and guide understanding. See DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL,
POLITICS AND POWER 8 (1988). This relatively broad definition follows the conceptual
understanding employed by most contemporary anthropologists. Until a generation ago, the
term “ritual” was more often used only to describe supernatural or religious rites. That earlier
definition stemmed from Emile Durkheim’s influential statement that rituals are “rules of
conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the presence of . . . sacred
objects.” EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 56 (Joseph W.
Swain trans., 1915). Durkheim believed that rituals were coercive moral forces dictating
acceptable behavior and, as such, identified rituals with organized religion. Contemporary
cultural scholars have broadened the focus somewhat by studying how all members in a culture
use the narratives produced by various social institutions to construct meaning. Thus, ritual has
become “an analytical category that helps us deal with the chaos of human experience and put
it into a coherent framework.” KERTZER, supra, at 8; see also id. at 1-14 (examining interplay
of politics, symbolism, and ritual).
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the longevity of forfeiture practice is explainable in part because
those with legal authority derive economic benefit from seizing
property.16 This Article makes no attempt to rebut these contentions,
for I am not here concerned with trying to explain why forfeitures or
trials of animals and inanimate objects have occurred. Nor do I take
a normative position on either the wisdom or the constitutionality of
civil forfeiture. Rather, I argue that we cannot debate the efficacy of
forfeiture without first recognizing all the possible functions
forfeiture might fulfill for a community.17 And the symbolic aspect of
forfeiture provides one possible way of understanding the practice
that appears to have been overlooked. In addition, focusing on this
symbolic function may shed useful light on the Court’s evocation of
history in Bennis and Ursery.
In the end, by understanding a custom seemingly so
unenlightened, we may come to understand our own need for
symbolic rituals to cleanse a community after a wrong has been
done.18 Only then can a debate about the uses and abuses of civil
forfeiture truly begin.

16. See, e.g., PHILIPPE DE BEAUMANOIR, COUTUMES DE BEAUVAISIS § 1944 (A.M.
Salmon ed., A. Picard 1970) (1283) (suggesting that the animal trials served only as a profitable
source of income for the feudal lords); HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS
30 (1995) (“[L]aw enforcement officials are allowed to keep all the proceeds from the property
they confiscate, an invitation to uncontrollable abuse.”).
17. It is important to recognize the difference between exploring the possible social
functions of a practice and explaining why that practice exists. Critics have often attacked
functionalist arguments for implying an unproved causal link. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES
AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 32 (1979) (“A large body of
sociological literature seems to rest upon an implicit regulative idea that if you can
demonstrate that a given pattern has unintended, unrecognized and beneficial effects, then you
have explained why it exists and persists.”). However, this Article does not explore the
possible social functions of legal proceedings against non-human transgressors for the purpose
of showing why these proceedings took place. Rather, a discussion of social function is useful
in order to recognize the cultural roles such proceedings may fulfill.
18. Professor John Langbein likewise has used historical European and English judicial
practices to illuminate contemporary American legal procedures regarding plea bargaining, see
John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978), the rules of
evidence, see John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from
the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1996); John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins
of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047 (1994), and
the role of lawyers, see John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI.
L. REV. 263 (1978). Although Langbein does not necessarily approve of the contemporary
legal procedures that have developed from these historical sources, see, e.g., John H. Langbein,
Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative Law, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 41, 41 (1997)
(describing the “disgraceful, truth-defeating excesses of adversary civil procedure in the United
States”), his work clearly reflects the understanding that studying the historical origins of
contemporary doctrines is important. See also BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, “BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE”: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW OF EVIDENCE (1991) (tracing historical development of contemporary evidentiary rules).
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I. BENNIS, URSERY, AND THE CRITICS OF MODERN FORFEITURE
LAW
This Part summarizes the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements
on civil forfeiture, Bennis v. Michigan19 and United States v. Ursery.20
Although the opinions for the Court in both cases simply recite
historical precedents undergirding civil forfeiture without much
analysis, both cases endorse concepts that, as we will see, are rooted
in the historical understanding of forfeiture as a symbolic cleansing
of an object that has transgressed societal norms. Bennis adopts the
idea that the culpability of the object’s owner is irrelevant because
the object itself is deemed to be guilty. And Ursery endorses the
notion that forfeiture is a remedial action brought against the object
to make the community whole and is therefore distinct from criminal
sanctions that may be pursued against the owner.
A. Bennis v. Michigan: The Object Is Guilty Even if the Owner Is Not
The Bennis case began in the fall of 1988 along Eight Mile Road in
Detroit, where prostitutes were enjoying “a flourishing business.”21
In response to demands from residents of the area “for relief from
the blighting effect of a disagreeable vice market,”22 Wayne County
prosecutors revived a Prohibition-era statute that had been used
against smugglers importing liquor from Canada.23 This law
permitted prosecutors to declare certain property used in criminal
activity a “public nuisance” and to confiscate it.24
Subsequently, the Wayne County police spotted John Bennis
engaged in an illicit act with a prostitute in the 1977 Pontiac that he
and his wife Tina jointly owned.25 John Bennis was charged with
“gross indecency,” for which he subsequently was convicted and
fined.26 The State of Michigan then went further and attempted to
seize the automobile under the public nuisance law.
At the nuisance proceeding in the trial court, Tina Bennis
testified—without contradiction—that she had no knowledge of her
19. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
20. 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
21. David G. Savage, Innocence Punished, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 47, 47.
22. George E. Ward, Letter to the Editor, Seizure Law Constitutionally Solid, DET. NEWS,
Mar. 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File.
23. See Savage, supra note 21, at 47.
24. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801 (West Supp. 1996) (“Any building, vehicle, boat,
aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling, or
used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes or other disorderly persons, . . . is declared a
nuisance, . . . and all . . . nuisances shall be enjoined and abated as provided in this act and as
provided in the court rules.”).
25. See Michigan v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Mich. 1994).
26. See id.
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husband’s use of the car for illicit acts.27 The Michigan Supreme
Court nonetheless upheld the forfeiture, concluding that Tina
Bennis’s claim of innocence was “without constitutional
consequence” under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.28 After surveying the forfeiture jurisprudence of the
United States Supreme Court, the Michigan court concluded that
“[h]istorically, consideration was not given to the innocence of an
owner because the property subject to forfeiture was the evil sought
to be remedied.”29
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, with Chief Justice
William Rehnquist writing for the five-to-four majority. The opinion
for the Court is notable in part because, except for one paragraph
that refers to the general deterrent value of forfeiture proceedings,30
it never discusess any possible rationale supporting the Court’s
decision to uphold a forfeiture against an innocent owner. Rather,
the Court simply recites what it calls “a long and unbroken line of
cases” permitting such an action.31 Moreover, none of the passages
quoted from this line of cases provides a rationale either. Thus, it
appears from the decision that civil forfeiture against an innocent
owner rests only on the invocation of precedent, without any
historical analysis or explanation.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s survey of Supreme Court precedent
begins with The Palmyra32 in 1827. In that case, the Court rejected a
shipowner’s contention that his vessel could not be forfeited for
privateering unless he was convicted of the charge. Instead, the
Court determined that “[t]he thing is here primarily considered the
offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing.”33
Similarly, in Harmony v. United States,34 an 1844 decision, Justice
Story wrote for the Court that “[t]he vessel which commits the
aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing
to which the forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to
the character or conduct of the owner.”35 The decision also quotes
Chief Justice Marshall in another admiralty case:
This is not a proceeding against the owner; it is a proceeding
against the vessel for an offence committed by the vessel; which

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Joint Appendix at 9, Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
Michigan v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 494.
Id. at 493-94.
See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452.
Id. at 446.
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
Id. at 14.
43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
Id. at 233.
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is not the less an offence, and does not the less subject her to
forfeiture because it was committed without the authority and
against the will of the owner.36
The Court’s opinion in Bennis continues with an 1877 case,
Dobbins’s Distillery v. United States,37 which involved the forfeiture
of a distillery because the lessee of the property had failed to pay
federal taxes. Although the purportedly innocent owner objected to
the forfeiture, the Dobbins’s Distillery Court noted that
“[t]hroughout the trial, the claimant appears to have assumed, as the
theory of the defence to the information, that he was the accused
party, and that he was on trial for a criminal offence created and
defined by an Act of Congress.”38 However, according to the Court,
“the forfeiture claimed in the information is aimed against the
distillery,”39 and “[n]othing can be plainer in legal decision than the
proposition that the offence therein defined is attached primarily to
the distillery, and the real and personal property used in connection
with the same, without any regard whatsoever to the personal
misconduct or responsibility of the owner . . . .”40 Indeed, the decision
in Dobbins’s Distillery quotes the earlier language in The Palmyra
and Harmony to support its understanding of forfeiture
proceedings.41
Turning to twentieth-century cases, the Bennis Court cites a 1921
decision, J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States.42 In that
case, the Court acknowledged that seizing the property of an
innocent owner “seems to violate that justice which should be the
foundation of the due process of law required by the Constitution”
and indicated that, “[i]f the case were the first of its kind, it and its
apparent paradoxes might compel a lengthy discussion to harmonize
[the forfeiture] with the accepted tests of human conduct.”43
Nevertheless, relying on Dobbins’s Distillery and the cases cited
therein, the Court concluded that forfeiture was “too firmly rooted
in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now
displaced.”44
Goldsmith-Grant is also the first of this line of cases to refer
explicitly to the older English actions against inanimate objects. The
36. Id. at 234 (quoting United States v. The Schooner Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979, 982
(D. Va. 1818) (No. 15,612)).
37. 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 395 (1877).
38. Id. at 399.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 401.
41. See id. at 399-400.
42. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
43. Id. at 510.
44. Id. at 511.
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Court observed that there “is some analogy” between the forfeiture
scheme at issue and “the law of deodand by which a personal chattel
that was the immediate cause of the death of any reasonable creature
was forfeited.”45 As to a possible rationale underlying deodands, the
Court referred to a “superstitious reason” for the law46 but did not
elaborate, preferring instead to quote Blackstone’s theory “‘[t]hat
such misfortunes are in part owing to the negligence of the owner,
and therefore, he is properly punishable by such forfeiture.’”47 Thus,
the more “superstitious” reasons that might be embedded in the
history of deodands were left unexplored.48
Although the subsequent decision in Van Oster v. Kansas49 did
little more than invoke Dobbins’s Distillery and Goldsmith-Grant to
justify upholding a forfeiture against a purportedly innocent owner,
the 1974 opinion for the Court in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing50 (the final case in this line cited in the Bennis decision)
again pointed to the link between deodands and forfeiture actions.
The Court even went so far as to observe that “[t]he origins of the
deodand are traceable to Biblical and pre-Judeo-Christian practices,
which reflected the view that the instrument of death was accused
and that religious expiation was required.”51 Ultimately, however, the
decision only invokes this historical precedent and never actually
explores the quasi-religious justifications for deodands or how these
justifications might still be relevant.
Having discussed the foregoing cases, the decision for the Court in
Bennis concludes, as did the Court in Goldsmith-Grant, that the
historical practice of forfeiture itself justifies its continuation.
Indeed, it is quite striking that Chief Justice Rehnquist not only fails
to mention possible religious or symbolic justifications for civil
forfeiture but also appears to find it unnecessary to provide any
justification at all for forfeiture practice beyond adherence to
precedent. The opinion of the Court devotes only one paragraph,
near the end of the decision, to a discussion of forfeiture’s
justifications, concluding rather half-heartedly that forfeitures, even

45. Id. at 510.
46. Id. at 511.
47. Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *301 (alteration added)).
48. The Court did quote from Blackstone’s observation linking the law of deodand to
proceedings against animals and inanimate objects under Mosaic and Athenian law. See id.; see
also infra text accompanying notes 144-46. However, despite the fact that these proceedings
seemed to have little to do with a conception of negligence, see infra text accompanying notes
198-205, the Court did not challenge Blackstone’s explanation for deodands, nor did it embark
on its own historical analysis.
49. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
50. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
51. Id. at 681 (citing OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881)).
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from innocent owners, can serve a deterrent purpose.52
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate concurrence,
acknowledging the seeming unfairness of the forfeiture as applied to
Tina Bennis, but relying, like the Chief Justice, on historical practice:
“One unaware of the history of forfeiture laws and 200 years of this
Court’s precedent regarding such laws,” he wrote, “might well
assume that such a scheme is lawless—a violation of due process.”53
Justice Thomas, however, approved the practice of depriving
potentially innocent owners of their property because tradition
sanctified such practice: “As detailed in the Court’s opinion and the
cases cited therein, forfeiture of property without proof of the
owner’s wrongdoing . . . has been permitted in England and this
country, both before and after the adoption of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.”54 Justice Thomas cited the Court’s
plurality in Burnham v. Superior Court55 for the proposition that a
process of law traceable to settled usage in England and this country
must be considered to comport with due process of law.56
To the surprise of some commentators, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg joined the majority in affirming the forfeiture.57 Her brief
concurrence will be discussed in more detail below. For now it will
suffice to note that, although her opinion does not explicitly refer to
the history of forfeiture practices at all, it does appear to invoke the
idea that forfeiture may have a symbolic function, an idea that can
perhaps best be understood by analyzing the history of legal
proceedings against inanimate objects and animals.
In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens called the notion of finding
objects guilty a “hoary fiction”58 and noted that the seizure of the car
could not be justified under any of what he considered to be the
plausible rationales for forfeiture. Thus, for example, he observed
that the car was not contraband, which might render seizure
necessary to remove it from circulation.59 It was not stolen property
that must be returned to the owner as restitution.60 It was not
property about which “the law may reasonably presume that the
owner . . . is aware of the principal use being made of that
52. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452.
53. Id. at 454 (Thomas, J., concurring).
54. Id.
55. 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion).
56. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 454-55 (Thomas, J., concurring).
57. See, e.g., Savage, supra note 21, at 48 (“Ginsburg’s opinion in Bennis ran counter to
both expectations from oral arguments and her larger reputation in some quarters for
liberalism on the bench.”); see also infra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
58. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 466 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 459.
60. See id. 459-60.
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property.”61 It was not property that actually facilitated the offense
because the act of prostitution could have occurred in numerous
locations.62 And, the removal of the car would not prevent repeated
violations of the law.63
Justice Stevens does acknowledge in a footnote, however, that
there might be another possible rationale underlying the forfeiture,
namely “that the neighborhood where the offense occurred
exhibited an ongoing ‘nuisance condition’ because it had a
reputation for illicit activity, and the car contributed to that
‘condition.’”64 However, he dismisses this theory as “tenuous.”65
According to Justice Stevens, “any other stationary part of the
neighborhood where such an offense could take place—a shed, for
example, or an apartment—could be forfeited on the same
rationale,” and he therefore rejects the idea.66 Nevertheless, a review
of the history underlying forfeiture indicates that perhaps this
rationale should not be dismissed quite so easily.67
B. United States v. Ursery: The Difference Between Forfeiture and
Punishment
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ursery concerned whether
forfeiture should be deemed to be “punishment” such that a
forfeiture action accompanying a criminal proceeding violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As in Bennis, the
Chief Justice, writing for the Court, cites historical precedent dating
to “the earliest years of this Nation”68 as well as “at common law”69 to
support his view that forfeiture is not “punishment.” And, as in
Bennis, there is little explanation of any rationale underlying the
forfeiture/punishment distinction.
Ursery was a consolidation of two different cases. In the first,
Michigan police found marijuana growing adjacent to Guy Ursery’s
house and discovered marijuana seeds, stems, stalks, and a growlight
within the house. The United States instituted civil forfeiture

61. Id. at 461.
62. See id. at 462-63.
63. See id. at 465.
64. Id. at 464 n.9 (quoting Michigan v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 491 (Mich. 1994)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Justice Kennedy also wrote a brief dissenting opinion in Bennis, in which he asserted
that the practical realities of needing to seize ships to insure compensation for injuries even
though the vessels’ owners were not present “provided a better justification for forfeiture than
earlier, more mechanistic rationales,” such as deodands, but that those “practical” reasons for
forfeiture should not be extended to automobiles. See id. at 472-73 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 274.
69. Id. at 275.

BERMAN.FORMAT.045

1999]

04/11/99 7:41 PM

Berman

13

proceedings against the house because it had been used to facilitate
the unlawful processing and distribution of a controlled substance.
Ursery ultimately agreed to pay the government $13,250. Shortly
before this settlement, Ursery was indicted for manufacturing
marijuana. After being found guilty, Ursery was sentenced to over
six years in prison.70
The second case at issue in Ursery involved Charles Wesley Arlt
and James Wren, who were convicted of various drug and money
laundering charges and sentenced to life imprisonment. Subsequent
to the convictions, the United States obtained a civil forfeiture
judgment against various property owned or controlled by the
defendants.71
In both cases, the Courts of Appeals ruled that the imposition of
both criminal penalties and civil forfeitures violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause. According to the appellate panels, the forfeiture
actions at issue constituted “punishment” for purposes of double
jeopardy and therefore could not be imposed in addition to the
criminal penalties.72
The Supreme Court reversed.73 While acknowledging that the
Double Jeopardy Clause “serves the function of preventing both
‘successive punishments . . . and successive prosecutions,’”74 the
Court nevertheless ruled that the forfeiture actions at issue (and civil
forfeitures generally) did not constitute punishment, and thus the
Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply.75 According to the Court,
“[s]ince the earliest years of this Nation, Congress has authorized the
Government to seek parallel in rem civil forfeiture actions and
criminal prosecutions based upon the same underlying events.”76
Further, the Court declared that “a long line” of prior Supreme
Court cases had “consistently” concluded that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not apply to civil forfeitures because such forfeitures do
not impose punishment.77
As in Bennis, the Court reviewed historical precedent. In a 1931
case, Various Items of Personal Property v. United States,78 the
70. See id. at 271.
71. See id. at 271-72.
72. See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 572-73 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
$405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1994).
73. The Court was unanimous on the judgment as to Arlt and Wren and was divided eight
to one on the judgment as to Ursery, with Justice Stevens dissenting. Justice Kennedy filed a
concurring opinion, and Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined, filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment.
74. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 273 (quoting United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993)).
75. See id. at 270-71.
76. Id. at 274.
77. Id.
78. 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
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Waterloo Distilling Corporation had been ordered to forfeit a
distillery, warehouse, and denaturing plant on the ground that the
corporation had conducted its distilling business in violation of
federal law. The government conceded that the corporation had
been convicted of criminal violations prior to the initiation of the
forfeiture proceeding and admitted that the criminal conviction had
been based upon “the transactions set forth . . . as a basis for the
forfeiture.”79 Nevertheless, the Court found that the forfeiture action
did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, explicitly
acknowledging the history of proceedings against inanimate objects:
[This] forfeiture proceeding . . . is in rem. It is the property
which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held
guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of
inanimate and insentient. In a criminal prosecution it is the
wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against, convicted, and
punished. The forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the
criminal offense. The provision of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution in respect of double jeopardy does not apply.80
According to the Ursery Court, at common law a criminal
conviction was never considered a bar to civil forfeiture.81 Thus,
“[f]or the Various Items Court to have held that the forfeiture was
prohibited by the prior criminal proceeding would have been directly
contrary to the common-law rule, and would have called into
question the constitutionality of forfeiture statutes thought
constitutional for over a century.”82
While the Bennis decision devotes one paragraph to discussing a
possible rationale underlying forfeiture practice, the Ursery Court
nowhere attempts to justify its treatment of civil forfeiture as
remedial rather than punitive, beyond the simple fact of historical
practice. Instead, the Court emphasizes the dispositive nature of its
historical analysis, pointing out that “[e]vidence of a longstanding
legislative practice ‘goes a long way in the direction of proving the
presence of unassailable grounds for the constitutionality of the
practice,’”83 and that “‘[i]n applying a provision like that of double
jeopardy, which is rooted in history and is not an evolving
concept . . . a long course of adjudication in this Court carries
impressive authority.’”84
79. Id. at 579.
80. Id. at 581.
81. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at 275.
82. Id. at 276.
83. Id. (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327-28
(1936)).
84. Id. at 278-79 (quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 392 (1958)).
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Although the Court ultimately left open the possibility that certain
forfeitures, such as fines, could be deemed punitive,85 Ursery firmly
ruled, based exclusively on the invocation of historical practice, that
in rem civil forfeiture is a “remedial civil sanction” that “does not
constitute a punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.”86 By
stressing the “remedial” nature of these forfeitures, the Court made
clear that a forfeiture action is brought on behalf of the community
to make it whole rather than simply to provide additional
punishment against an individual human being.87
C. The Critics
While the decisions in Bennis and Ursery fail to illuminate the
history on which they rely, the critics of these decisions, and of civil
forfeiture generally, have not provided much guidance either.
Indeed, those critics who have acknowledged this history have
generally done so solely to dismiss forfeiture as an archaic “legal
fiction” with irrational roots. Such a perspective ignores any
possibility that the history of proceedings against non-human
transgressors might provide some insight into forfeiture practice
today.
The most extensive published broadside against forfeiture law to
date is Leonard W. Levy’s A License to Steal: The Forfeiture of
Property.88 As the title suggests, Levy’s work is an excoriation of
modern forfeiture practice. As he states bluntly in his preface, “[i]n
the case of civil forfeiture, unfairness and injustice always prevail.”89
Although Levy devotes his first chapter to a review of the history
underlying modern forfeiture, it appears that his sole aim in doing so
is to expose the purportedly nonsensical roots of the practice. Thus,
he makes no effort to understand the law of deodands as anything
other than a primitive and pointless custom. Instead, he quotes
Blackstone, who dismissed the law of deodands as having a
“superstitious purpose” derived from the “blind days of popery.”90
85. See id. at 280.
86. Id. at 278.
87. In its most recent pronouncement on forfeiture, United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct.
2028 (1998), the Supreme Court again invoked the history of actions against inanimate objects
to support the conclusion that civil in rem forfeitures are actions against the object, rather than
punishment against the individual for an offense. Id. at 2034-35. The Court also reiterated that,
“[h]istorically, the conduct of the property owner was irrelevant; indeed, the owner of forfeited
property could be entirely innocent of any crime.” Id. at 2034. The Court held, however, that
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment governed forfeiture proceedings and
then voided as excessive a $250,000 forfeiture based on a failure to report currency to customs
officials.
88. LEVY, supra note 3.
89. Id. at x.
90. Id. at 15 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300).
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Rather than attempting to understand how the proceedings against
animals and inanimate objects might have been viewed in their own
time, Levy focuses on various after-the-fact policy justifications
offered by Blackstone and other more modern legal commentators.91
Not surprisingly, Levy concludes that there is no adequate
explanation “why a rational legal system regarded the dumb beast or
the inanimate object as a guilty party deserving punishment.”92
Therefore, to Levy, “[t]he law of deodands, like the law of civil
forfeiture, was a tissue of legal fictions and contradictions. It was also
unjust to its core.”93
Other forfeiture critics have taken a similar approach. Thus, the
history of legal proceedings against non-human transgressors has
been described as the root of “the curious and archaic legal fictions
upon which all civil forfeitures are premised.”94 The “fiction” that
objects can be guilty of crimes has been described as
“anachronistic,”95 “ancient and obsolete,”96 “repugnant,”97 and a
“perversion.”98 One commentator has labeled this supposed fiction
“about as irrational and unjust a proposition as a sober mind can
concoct,”99 and another has rejected it as “simply too fantastic to
require much rebuttal.”100 Still another has written that “civil
forfeiture statutes would almost surely be struck down as
unconstitutional were it not for the courts’ continued reliance on an
ancient common law doctrine that is no longer relevant and is
unrecognized in any other segment of our society.”101 Even those
who have sought to defend modern forfeiture laws have
acknowledged that the “guilty property fiction . . . is an easy target”
for critics.102
91. See id. at 15-19.
92. Id. at 17.
93. Id. at 19.
94. Michelle M. Jochner, The Supreme Court Turns Back the Clock on Civil Forfeiture in
Bennis, 85 ILL. B.J. 314, 314 (1997).
95. Tamara R. Piety, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has
Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 911, 918 (1991).
96. Lieske, supra note 12, at 270.
97. Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (Tenn. 1916).
98. W. SEAGLE, THE QUEST FOR LAW 126 (1941).
99. Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 257
(1973).
100. Roger Pilon, Can American Asset Forfeiture Law Be Justified?, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 311, 332 (1994); see also Erik G. Luna, Note, Fiction Trumps Innocence: The Bennis
Court’s Constitutional House of Cards, 49 STAN. L. REV. 409, 419 (1997) (“The concept of
guilty property has problems passing the ‘laugh test’ today.”).
101. Lieske, supra note 12, at 267.
102. Richard H. Seamon, “Not Now” Does Not Necessarily Mean “Not Ever”: The
Supreme Court’s Refusal in Bennis v. Michigan to Abandon the “Guilty Property” Fiction of
Forfeiture Law, 48 S.C. L. REV. 389, 390 (1997).
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Criticism of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bennis and Ursery
has likewise addressed the Court’s reliance on history. One
commentator argues that “the majority’s decision in Bennis turns
back the clock from the present to the past, resorting to ancient
fictions that have little, if any, relevance today.”103 Another writer
has posited that “none of the original bases of in rem forfeiture have
relevance in today’s legal proceedings” and criticized the Bennis
Court for choosing “to unquestioningly promote the ancient legal
fiction of the guilt of inanimate objects.”104 Similarly, the Ursery
decision has been condemned because it “appears to reinforce [an]
antiquated [guilty property] fiction” that “is no longer viable as a
justification for powerful and broadly sweeping modern forfeiture
laws.”105
What is most remarkable about these criticisms is that none even
attempts to understand the legal proceedings against non-human
transgressors from the perspective of those who originally took part
in the proceedings.106 Instead, simply because we now consider it
irrational to find an inanimate object or an animal guilty of a crime,
these critics assume that this history could not possibly provide a
justification for (or even an understanding of) modern forfeiture
law.107
Thus, both the Court and its critics have failed to seek insight from
the very history they invoke to support their positions. Although
possible policy justifications are offered or discarded, neither side in
the forfeiture debate attempts to ask what type of societal role these
proceedings might have played and whether forfeiture might
possibly fulfill a similar role today. Accordingly, this history deserves

103. Jochner, supra note 94, at 320.
104. George M. Dery III, Adding Injury to Insult: The Supreme Court’s Extension of Civil
Forfeiture to its Illogical Extreme in Bennis v. Michigan, 48 S.C. L. REV. 359, 376 (1997).
105. Sarah Jean Watterson, Note, Putting the Halper Genie Back in the Bottle: Examining
United States v. Ursery in Light of Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch, 1997 BYU L. REV. 235,
261; see also Kevin Cole, Civilizing Civil Forfeiture, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 249, 249
(1996) (“[T]he Court’s opinion says little about justice; it is largely an assessment of the
historical acceptance of forfeiture as a civil remedy.”); Ronner, supra note 4, at 766 (In Ursery,
“the Court revitalize[d] and deif[ied] the old forfeiture myths that traditionally kept double
jeopardy protection at bay.”).
106. At least one commentator has gone so far as to ask the appropriate question: “What
function did the personification fiction perform, and what is there about deodand that bears
any relationship to civil forfeiture which would justify reliance on it?” Piety, supra note 95, at
931. However, she dismisses the inquiry as “unanswerable,” id., and falls back on the legal
positivist notion that the personification fiction was used simply because it was the law, id. at
931-34. This view, of course, begs the question of the function this particular law might have
fulfilled for the community.
107. See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also Be
Fair? Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 31-32
(“A fresh look at the reality of forfeiture and judging it by a contemporary understanding of
constitutional law . . . underlies the requiem for the fiction of ‘guilty property’. . . .”).
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a long-overdue second look.
II. NARRATIVES OF GUILT AND EXPIATION: THE HISTORY OF
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST INANIMATE OBJECTS AND
ANIMALS
When a transgressor breaches a societal norm, the act, by
definition, causes a rift in the social fabric. In response, the
community must construct a narrative,108 or provide “social
meaning”109 for understanding and healing that breach.
Anthropologists have long recognized that narratives are the vehicle
by which we construct the meaning we take from the world around
us. These narratives provide a framework to interpret what we
experience and a language for describing reality. “Every telling is an
arbitrary imposition of meaning on the flow of memory . . . every
telling is interpretive.”110
Narratives are particularly relied upon in times of change,
disorientation, and trauma. Thus, a disaster will stimulate
“pronouncements, prayers, eulogies, addresses, white papers, and
other formal offerings that later dissolve back into the welter of
conversation characterizing the ordinary business of living
together.”111 A society’s primary social institutions must function as
storytellers at such crisis moments. Religious narratives and their
accompanying rituals are the clearest example of an institution
constructing meaning out of death and other irrational and
frightening events.112 The rites link us to our past and future by

108. See supra note 14.
109. Some scholars have preferred to use the term “social meaning” to describe the broad
inquiry I encapsulate in the word “narrative.” See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995). But regardless of the label, both concepts are
similar attempts “to find a way to speak of the frameworks of understanding within which
individuals live; a way to describe what they take or understand various actions, or inactions, or
statuses to be; and a way to understand how the understandings change.” Id. at 952. Both of
these concepts must be distinguished, however, from the idea of a “social norm.” Cass Sunstein
has defined “norms” as “social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to
be done and what ought not to be done.” Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 903, 911 (1996). Although the study of social norms is obviously related to the
study of how meaning is constructed (and a social norm is certainly a “narrative” as I use that
term), it is important to understand that the issue of social norms centers more on the question
of the optimal societal rules for regulating external behavior, whereas I have chosen to pursue
a less normative and more psychological account of how people come to apprehend and
describe reality, as well as the possible effect these narrative choices might have for the
community. Nevertheless, my conclusions may be valuable for those who seek to use forfeiture
law to enforce social norms. See infra notes 286-90 and accompanying text.
110. Edward M. Bruner, Experience and Its Expressions, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
EXPERIENCE, supra note 14, at 3, 9.
111. Robert Hariman, Performing the Laws: Popular Trials and Social Knowledge, in
POPULAR TRIALS: RHETORIC, MASS MEDIA, AND THE LAW 19 (Robert Hariman ed., 1990).
112. See LEVI-STRAUSS, supra note 14, at 186-204.
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enacting enduring and underlying patterns.113 And the narratives
provide explanations, or affirmations of faith, or parables, all of
which create a framework for understanding the crisis event and
healing psychological wounds. Thus, it has been said that cultural
narratives provide a “shield against terror.”114
Courts too are social institutions that tell stories about chaotic
events. Legal processes provide cultural narratives for imposing
order and asserting the primacy of the community. Indeed, the
English word “law” derives from Old Norse, where the word not
only referred to rules of conduct, but also to the community itself,
which shared those laws.115 Thus, the term “outlaw” originally
described someone who had been expelled from the community and
therefore literally stood outside the law.116
Banishment is one way in which communities reassert a shared
moral order after the breach of a norm. By casting out the
transgressor, the community redefines its own boundaries and
creates a narrative whereby a tainted element is deemed to be
“beyond the pale” of the society.117 Through a “status degradation
ceremony,”118 the transgressor is “ritually separated from a place in
the legitimate order . . . [and] defined as standing at a place opposed
to it.”119 Imposing this new degraded status on the transgressor,
whether temporarily or permanently, is “a means of demarcating the
boundaries between the normative community and those who ha[ve]
offended against it.”120
We are familiar with such banishment rituals involving human
members of society who breach norms of behavior. These individuals
are expelled from public life, usually through incarceration, after first
taking part in a legal proceeding that functions as a “status
degradation ceremony.” However, as this Part demonstrates, various
cultures, including our own, have at times taken similar action
against non-human actors by creating a narrative whereby an
inanimate object or an animal that transgresses the established order
is deemed to have committed a crime and is punished as the guilty

113. See KERTZER, supra note 15, at 9-10.
114. Id. at 4.
115. See William I. Miller, Of Outlaws, Christians, Horsemeat, and Writing: Uniform Laws
and Saga Iceland, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2081, 2082 (1991).
116. See id.
117. ESTHER COHEN, THE CROSSROADS OF JUSTICE: LAW AND CULTURE IN LATE
MEDIEVAL FRANCE 82 (1993).
118. Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, AM. J. SOC. 420,
420 (1960).
119. Id. at 423.
120. COHEN, supra note 117, at 80; see also id. at 77-80 (describing a particular medieval
status degradation ceremony known as Chrenecruda).
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party. While it is certainly true that the cultural meaning ascribed to
such historical rituals may have been very different from our present
conception of guilt and punishment, nevertheless, by focusing on the
narratives created in these rituals, we may gain insight about current
practice.
This Part begins with a brief survey of historical evidence about
the trials of inanimate objects and animals in ancient Greece and
then describes English and European trials from the ninth to the
nineteenth centuries. We shall see that, for the purpose of these
proceedings, it appears to have been irrelevant whether the owner of
the transgressing object or animal was at all responsible for the
“crime.” Rather, these actions were seen as necessary to restore the
society’s equilibrium, and they were pursued on behalf of the
community in proceedings that were wholly separate from any
criminal or civil penalties that might lie against the owner. Thus,
although modern commentators often refer to these proceedings as
resting on a “legal fiction” that non-human actors could be guilty of
crimes, there is no indication that these proceedings were actually
conceptualized as “fictions” or that somehow the “real” parties
before the court were the human owners. Instead, these trials
demonstrate the extremes to which communities would go to remove
the taint that accompanied a violation of the established order, no
matter what form the transgression might take.
A. Appeasing the Furies in Ancient Greece
On the north side of the Athenian Acropolis stood a building
called the Prytaneion, which acted as a ceremonial center of the city
and as a site for special social functions.121 In addition, a law court
located in the building was dedicated to hearing only three kinds of
cases: those in which (1) a murderer was unknown or could not be
found; (2) a death was caused by an inanimate object; or (3) an
animal had killed a human being.122
No substantive governmental activity appears to have taken place
at the Prytaneion.123 Rather, it was “the common hearth of the city,
which represented the unity and vitality of the community.”124 From
121. See J.J. Finkelstein, The Ox That Gored, 71 AM. PHIL. SOC’Y (pt. 2) 5, 58 (1981); see
also JOHN W. JONES, THE LAW AND LEGAL THEORY OF THE GREEKS 256-57 (1977) (using
the Latin spelling “Prytaneum.”).
122. See Finkelstein, supra note 121, at 58; see also ARISTOTLE, CONSTITUTION OF
ATHENS AND RELATED TEXTS 135 (Kurt Von Fritz & Ernst Kapp trans., Hafner Pub. Co.
1950) (“When [one] does not know who committed the offense, he institutes proceedings
against ‘the unknown who did the deed.’ The [officials at the Prytaneion] conduct
prosecution[s] of inanimate things and animals also.”).
123. See Finkelstein, supra note 121, at 58.
124. Walter W. Hyde, The Prosecution and Punishment of Animals and Lifeless Things in
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its perpetual fire, colonists would carry sparks to their new homes as
a symbol of loyalty and connection with the mother city.125 Thus, the
Prytaneion appears to have served as the symbol of the community
order, and it is not surprising that these legal proceedings against
inanimate objects and animals should have occurred there.126
Classics scholar Walter Woodburn Hyde has gathered together the
few references to the Prytaneion in the extant Greek literature. He
concludes that, though ceremonial in character, the trials observed
ordinary procedural requirements.127 Even jurisdiction was
sometimes at issue. In one instance, a boy was killed by a javelin
while watching a man practice in the gymnasium.128 The court was
forced to determine whether the boy, the man, or the javelin was to
blame. Only if it were deemed to be a trial of the javelin could the
case be heard at the Prytaneion.129 Although such questions sound
fanciful, they were apparently taken very seriously. According to
Plutarch, the great statesman Pericles once spent an entire day
arguing with the famous sophist Protagoras about the issue.130
This jurisdictional dispute suggests that the action against the
object was not conceived as a fiction standing in for a trial against a
negligent or guilty owner. Rather, the javelin was considered to be
capable of its own guilt, quite apart from the person who threw it,
and the community took action to rid itself of the moral taint
attaching to the object itself. The proceedings in the Prytaneion, like
all other murder trials, took place in the open air so that the judges
would not be contaminated by moral pollution emanating from the
accused.131 And, if the accused were found guilty, the court issued an
order banishing the offending object or animal beyond the borders
of the city.132 Oliver Wendell Holmes observed that the ancient
the Middle Ages and Modern Times, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 696, 696 (1916).
125. See id.
126. Cf. S.C. TODD, THE SHAPE OF ATHENIAN LAW 275 (1993) (“[The Prytaneion’s]
functions appear to have been mainly ritual.”).
127. See Hyde, supra note 124.
128. See id. at 697-98.
129. See id.
130. See 1 PLUTARCH’S LIVES 260 (Arthur H. Clough ed., Everyman’s Library, Dutton
1961).
131. See Hyde, supra note 124, at 696-97. See generally JONES, supra note 121, at 254-57
(discussing the conception of pollution in ancient Greece and methods used to diminish its
danger).
132. See JONES, supra note 121, at 256-57; see also, e.g., D.M. MACDOWELL, ATHENIAN
HOMICIDE LAW IN THE AGE OF THE ORATORS 86-87 (1963) (quoting Demosthenes (352
B.C.E.) (“[I]f an inanimate object falling on someone hits him and kills him, a trial is held for it
in [the Prytaneion] and it is cast beyond the frontier.”)); H. MYERS & J. BRZOSTOWSKI, U.S.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUG AGENTS’ GUIDE TO FORFEITURE OF ASSETS 3 (1981)
(quoting Aeschines the Greek (389-314 B.C.E.) (“[W]e banish beyond our borders stocks and
stones . . . and mindless things if they chance to kill a man.”)); Finkelstein, supra note 121, at 58
(quoting Pollux (2d century A.D.) (“[The Prytaneion] was presided over by the phylobasileis,
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Greeks banished inanimate objects in precisely the same way that a
person would be ostracized for committing a crime.133 Thus, after a
statue fell on a man, the statue was tried, found guilty, and cast into
the sea beyond the borders.134 This belief in the guilt of objects even
extended to the requirement that, if a person committed suicide, the
hand that struck the fatal blow be severed and buried separately
from the body.135
Evidence exists that many societies throughout the world have
conducted similar proceedings and rituals against inanimate objects.
Hyde presents examples of actions against trees, rocks, arrows,
swords, axes, houses, boats, wooden idols, and even glaciers, for the
damage done to mountain valleys.136 He argues that these trials were
required to restore the “moral equilibrium” of the community after a
killing.137
For the Greeks, it was necessary to ascribe guilt and punishment to
the offending object or animal lest the Furies, avenging spirits of the
dead person, create misfortunes throughout the land.138 Indeed, the
sense of “moral equilibrium” described by Hyde is expressed
frequently in Greek dramas, where plagues, famine, storms, and
other misfortunes in the natural world are often attributable to an
unexpiated wrong within the society.139 Plato goes so far as to view
the guilt from a killing as attaching to the family of the deceased,
rather than to the accused:
[I]f any lifeless thing deprive a man of life, except in the case of
a thunderbolt or other fatal dart sent from the gods—whether a
man is killed by lifeless objects falling upon him, or his falling
upon them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest neighbor
to be a judge and thereby acquit himself and the whole family of
guilt. And he shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond the
whose duty it was to remove beyond the border the inanimate object which had fallen upon the
man.”)).
133. See HOLMES, supra note 11, at 10.
134. See Hyde, supra note 124, at 702.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 724-26. Hyde states: “The notion . . . that lifeless things are . . . responsible
agents like animals and men, can be evidenced from every stratum of human society from the
lowest to the highest.” Id. at 724. With only Hyde’s anecdotal evidence to support his
statement, however, we must regard it as an overly broad generalization.
137. Id. at 698.
138. See EVANS, supra note 13, at 9. In the last play in Aeschylus’s Oresteia trilogy, it is to
placate the Furies of the slain Clytemnestra that Athena “remands” the case of Orestes to a
human court at Athens, beginning the age of human rather than divine law. See AESCHYLUS,
The Eumenides, in ORESTEIA 133, 151-52 (Richmond Lattimore trans., Univ. Chicago Press
1953) (lines 470-89); see also Burt Neuborne, Ghosts in the Attic: Idealized Pluralism,
Community and Hate Speech, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 371, 372 (1992) (“The Oresteia
ushers in the luminous idea of law, not force, as the mediator between self and community.”).
139. See, e.g., SOPHOCLES, King Oedipus, in THE THEBAN PLAYS 25, 26-27 (E.F. Watling
trans., Penguin 1947).
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border.140
The trial was therefore necessary to cleanse the family and, by
implication, the community as a whole.
Perhaps most illuminating is the ceremony held each year at the
Prytaneion during Roman times, in which an axe was ceremonially
tried, declared guilty, condemned, and cast into the sea.141 This
ceremony was understood to be “in commemoration of the
traditional first slaying of an ox on the Acropolis in prehistoric
times.”142 Again, it is clear that the action was prosecuted on behalf
of the community to remove a symbol of moral guilt so as to redeem
the community and establish equilibrium. As with the hand that was
severed from the body of a person who committed suicide, so too a
guilty object would be seized by the community and symbolically
removed from the body politic.
B. “Banishing” Transgressors Through Forfeiture, Excommunication,
and Execution in England and Europe
After the collapse of the Roman Empire, many societies in Europe
developed traditions whereby inanimate objects and animals that
caused the death of human beings were cast out of the human
community. Evidence of these proceedings stretches as far back as
the ninth century and continues even into the twentieth century. As
with the examples from ancient Greece, there is no indication that
these legal proceedings against inanimate objects and animals served
as proxies for actions against negligent or culpable owners. Instead,
we again see communities constructing narratives of guilt after the
breach of a social norm and then creating a symbolic way of
cleansing the community to preserve the societal order.143
The proceedings against animals and inanimate objects, both in
England and on the Continent, appear to derive from the Bible
140. PLATO, THE LAWS 269 (Thomas Pangle trans., Basic Books 1980) (emphasis added);
see also LEO STRAUSS, THE ARGUMENT AND THE ACTION OF PLATO’S LAWS 136 (1975)
(arguing that the punishment for such murders “does not serve the purpose of improvement or
deterrence but that of expiation of the family of the killed man.”). Oddly, Strauss does not
mention that the act might be seen as a crime against the community’s order, despite his focus
on punishment as safeguarding the health of the regime elsewhere in his discussion of murder.
See id. at 134.
141. See 3 JAMES G. FRAZER, FOLK-LORE IN THE OLD TESTAMENT 421 (1918). According
to Hyde, the axe was acquitted each year. See Hyde, supra note 124, at 699. However, the
actual disposition of the axe is immaterial to the basic point that the inanimate object was tried
in order to cleanse the community of a moral taint.
142. Hyde, supra note 124, at 699.
143. As is clear from this discussion, the various traditions with regard to legal action
against inanimate objects and animals appear to have transformed over time, and undoubtedly
the cultural meaning ascribed to the rituals changed as well. Nevertheless, the narrative of guilt
and the notion of ritual cleansing appear to survive throughout the various permutations of this
tradition.
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where, in the Book of Exodus, an ox that killed a human being was
sentenced to death by stoning, and its flesh could not be eaten.144 The
punishment of stoning is a distinctive sentence in the Bible, reserved
for only a few types of crimes.
In those cases, there is no designated “executioner,” for the
community assembled is the common executioner of the
sentence. Offenses that entail this mode of execution must
therefore be of a character that, either in theory or in fact,
“offend” the corporate community or are believed to
compromise its most cherished values to the degree that the
commission of the offense places the community itself in
jeopardy.145
The Biblical treatment of the ox indicates that, as in ancient
Greece, actions against non-human transgressors were treated as
crimes against the community as a whole. Moreover, it was irrelevant
whether or not the ox was “morally” guilty. Rather, the guilt was
treated as an objective contagion that “must be eradicated in the
most public way, and the public must participate in the act of
eradication as a demonstration that it is consciously and effectively
restoring the order that had been disturbed.”146
In addition to this Biblical command, the English law of the
deodand also derived from reaction to the ancient tradition of the
blood feud, wherein the kin of the deceased would seek vengeance
against whomever was the cause of the death.147 To stop the cycle of
violence caused by these feuds, communities adopted codes intended
to persuade the relatives of the deceased to accept pecuniary
compensation rather than exacting their revenge in blood.148 This

144. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *301 (likening the deodand practice
to the Mosaic law); 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 57 (William S.
Hein Co. 1986) (1797) (“And this law concerning deodands is grounded upon the law of God,
Exodus 2:28.”). Although Jacob J. Finkelstein argues that the stoning of the ox should not be
viewed as a form of deodand, he nevertheless acknowledges that the institution of the
deodands is in part the result of this Biblical tradition. See Finkelstein, supra note 99, at 180-81.
145. Finkelstein, supra note 121, at 26-27. Stoning is also called for in the Bible as a
punishment for worshiping foreign gods, being a disloyal son, being a non-virginal bride, and
engaging in adultery, child sacrifice, sorcery, necromancy, blasphemy, sedition, and violation of
the Sabbath. See id. at 27. “The common denominator of all the offenses entailing the
punishment of death by stoning is that they are thought to strike at the moral and religious
fibers which the community as a whole sees as defining its essence and integrity. Such crimes,
in other words, amount to insurrections against the cosmic order itself.” Id. at 27-28.
146. Id. at 58.
147. See 2 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 43-44 (1927)
(discussing the practice of the blood feud).
148. See id. at 44 (“The most obvious method of putting a stop to the feud is to persuade
the injured man or the relatives of the deceased to accept some pecuniary compensation.”); see
also John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 474, 493 (1909) (discussing stages of development in
various societies from the blood feud to “mere pecuniary liability”).
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tradition was known as “noxal surrender.”149 Eventually an offering
was also given both to the lord over the place where the wrong was
done and to the lord whose subject had been slain.150 These monetary
payments implicitly acknowledged that it was not only the victim’s
kin that needed redress, but the broader society as well:151
In the [payment], we can see the germ of the idea that wrong is
not simply the affair of the injured individual—an idea which is
the condition precedent to the growth of a criminal law. A
wrong is regarded as a breach of the [peace] of the king, of a
community . . . .152
The various offerings appeased both the kin and the community and
therefore restored harmony.153
The ninth-century Anglo-Saxon laws of Alfred the Great blended
the Biblical tradition with these offerings and created a proceeding
resembling forfeiture that later became known as deodand in the
English common law.154 Under this code, rather than condemning an
animal transgressor to death by stoning, the animal was surrendered
to the authorities for retribution.155 In addition, if a tree fell on
someone, the victim’s kin were permitted to take the tree in order to
expiate the death.156 Significantly, the guilty object was given to the
kin not as compensation for the loss suffered, but rather as an object
upon which their vengeance must be wrought before the dead person
could lie in peace.157
Ultimately, the Crown replaced the kin as the prosecuting entity.158
The word “deodand” derives from the Latin phrase “deo dandum,”
which literally means “given to God.”159 Thus, the offending object
“was forfeited to God, that is, to the King, God’s Lieutenant on

149. Finkelstein, supra note 99, at 181; see 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 147, at 52-53
(discussing deodands after stating that “[w]e have seen that there are some traces in AngloSaxon law of noxal liability”).
150. See 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 147, at 45 (discussing such payments under AngloSaxon law).
151. See id. at 47.
152. Id.
153. Cf. id. at 45 (“We cannot understand either the amount of the [offering] or the
method of its payment unless we remember that it took the place of the feud, and that the feud
was always in the background to be resorted to if the money was not paid.”).
154. See RICHARD B. MORRIS, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 227 (1930).
155. See LEVY, supra note 3, at 10.
156. See Finkelstein, supra note 99, at 181 (linking this practice to noxal surrender).
157. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 474 (2d ed. 1898).
158. See LEVY, supra note 3, at 11 (“[T]he guilty object required community atonement by
providing compensation to someone in charge, like a chieftain or king. He was the one
responsible for keeping the peace that had been shattered by the homicide, even if it was
accidental.”).
159. Id. at 7.
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earth, to be distributed in works of charity for the appeasing of
God’s wrath.”160 Indeed, the King originally used money collected as
a result of the deodand to fund a mass for the dead person’s soul,161
emphasizing the connection between forfeiture and religious
expiation.
Many instances of deodand forfeitures exist in the historical
literature.162 An early treatise refers to mischances involving falls
from trees, ships, boats, carts, horses, and mills, and decrees that the
objects causing the death in these cases shall be adjudged
deodands.163 Another history refers to horses, oxen, carts, boats, millwheels, and cauldrons as the most common deodands.164 Thus, for
example, a boat that capsized, causing a fisherman to die, was
beached, cursed, and allowed to rot,165 and a horse that carried a man
over a cliff or into water, drowning him, was forfeited.166
Deodand proceedings were decided by a twelve-person jury, as in
trials of human beings.167 The jury actively investigated the
occurrence to determine whether the object had actually caused the
death in question.168 If so, the object was forfeited or accursed.169
However, inanimate objects involved in the death of a human being
were not always found guilty. For example, if a person were thrown
from a horse and hit a tree trunk, the horse was guilty, but not the
tree,170 presumably because the tree had not moved during the
incident.171 Likewise, if an adult “getting up a cart by the wheel to
160. 3 COKE, supra note 144, at 57; see also 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 157, at
473 (quoting Coke as part of their explanation of deodands).
161. See 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 424 (R.H.
Small 1847) (1680) (“Anciently, it seems, when any person came suddenly by his death by the
accidental agency of any animate or inanimate chattel, the chattel was to be given to the
church for masses for the soul of the deceased.”).
162. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 144, at *300-02 (listing examples of deodands); 1
HALE, supra note 161, at 419-24 (same).
163. See 1 BRITTON 39 (Francis M. Nichols trans., Clarendon Press 1865).
164. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 157, at 473.
165. See LEVY, supra note 3, at 10.
166. See id. at 12.
167. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 47, at *301 (“[F]or it is no deodand unless it be
presented as such by a jury of twelve men.”).
168. See 1 HALE, supra note 161, at 419 (“[Deodands] are not forfeit till the death be
found, which is regularly by the coroner . . . and hence it is, that these goods . . . cannot be
claimed by prescription, because there must appear a title to them by matter of record, before
they are forfeited.”); see also 1 BRITTON, supra note 163, at 16 (“And of those drowned in
fountains and wells, we will, as in the other cases, that the coroners admit to mainprise the first
finders, and enroll their names and the names of their pledges; and of those who have come to
their deaths by carts or mills, and in the like cases, let the coroner make his inquests and
enrollments as above directed where persons are drowned.”).
169. See Hyde, supra note 124, at 729.
170. See 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 77
(London, MacMillan 1883).
171. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 144, at *300-01(discussing the difference in treatment
under the law of deodand between objects that move and those that do not).
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gather plums” fell and was killed, the wheel was a deodand, but if a
child under fourteen fell from a cart or horse, it was not a deodand,
“because [the child] was not of discretion to look to himself,” and so
the cart or the horse could not be blamed.172 If, however, a cart ran
over a child, or a tree fell and killed him, or a bull gored him, then it
was deodand, because it went out of its way to kill him.173
In determining which object to count as a deodand, fine
distinctions were sometimes made. For example, if a person were
carried under the wheel of a mill, the wheel would be forfeited, but
not the entire mill.174 Similarly, “[i]f a weight of earth fall upon a
worker in a mine and kill him, the weight of earth is forfeit, not the
whole mine.”175 However, if a tree fell, hitting the branch of another
tree, and that branch in turn hit a person, both the falling tree and
the arguably innocent branch were forfeited.176
The law of deodands migrated to the American colonies and
entered the legal annals of this country as well.177 Thus, an inquest
before a jury was held on January 31, 1637, regarding the body of a
planter who had been felled by a falling tree. According to the trial
record, “the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, say that the
said tree moved to the death of the said John Bryant; and therefore
find the said tree forfeited to the Lord Proprietor.”178 Likewise,
under a Massachusetts statute of 1648, a dog that killed sheep could
be hanged.179 One commentator reports that, at least through the
eighteenth century, deodand forfeitures appear to have been
accepted in this country as “routine procedure.”180 In early colonial
vice admiralty courts, ships were treated as if they were alive, and

172. 1 HALE, supra note 161, at 422.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 420.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 419.
177. See MORRIS, supra note 154, at 227; Cyrus H. Karraker, Deodands in Virginia and
Maryland, 37 AM. HIST. REV. 712, 713 (1932) (“Deodands occurred, it seems, in all the
colonies.”); see also THE EARLIEST ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND
PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 1647-1719, at 61 (John D. Cushing ed., 1977) (quoting a 1663 law:
“For as much as A man may be Slaine by other cafsulties then by the Hand of A man . . . ye
thing yt accafsioned his Death . . . shall be seized . . . & taken as ye Deodands are in
England . . . .”).
178. MORRIS, supra note 154, at 227 (quoting 4 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 9, 10 (W.F.
Browne ed., 1883)).
179. See id. at 229. In addition, if the owner had knowledge of the dog’s dangerous habits,
the owner would pay a fine over and above the forfeiture of the animal, see id., again
suggesting that the action against the animal was considered to be wholly separate from any
possible action against the owner. Although the action against the dog can be seen as a safety
precaution to remove a dog that might still be dangerous, such an explanation does not account
for why a legal proceeding, or indeed a public hanging, was thought necessary.
180. Id.; see also Karraker, supra note 177, at 712-17 (discussing deodand practice in
Virginia and Maryland).
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prosecutions were initiated against vessels by name. As Holmes
observed: “It is only by supposing the ship to have been treated as if
endowed with personality, that the arbitrary seeming peculiarities of
the maritime law can be made intelligible.”181
In continental Europe, legal proceedings against animals
constructed a similar narrative of guilt attaching to a non-human
actor.182 When a domesticated animal caused the death of a human
being, the beast was treated in all ways possible as a human criminal.
Animals were confined in human prisons and subjected to the same
treatment as human prisoners.183
Once the trial began, it too was conducted just as if the defendant
were a human being. Both the prosecution and defense were
represented by professional advocates.184 Witnesses and evidence
were heard prior to punishment. And though the animals were
usually found guilty, such a verdict certainly was not assured. For
example, in 1457 the sucklings of a sow that had murdered a fiveyear-old child were included in the indictment. They had been found
at the scene of the crime stained with blood, but “in lack of any
positive proof that they assisted in mangling the deceased, they were
restored to their owner, on condition that he should give bail for
their appearance, should further evidence be forth-coming to prove
their complicity in their mother’s crime.”185 Likewise, in 1750 a man
and a donkey, discovered in an act of copulation, were both charged
with bestiality, but while the man was sentenced to death, the
donkey was subsequently acquitted on the ground that she was the
victim of violence and had not participated in her master’s crime of
her own free will.186 At trial, the defense had presented a statement
signed by many inhabitants of the commune stating that they had
known the donkey for four years, that she had always shown herself
to be virtuous and well-behaved both at home and abroad, and that
she had never given occasion of scandal to anyone. Therefore, “they
were willing to bear witness that she is in word and deed and in all

181. HOLMES, supra note 11, at 25. Although some commentators point out that admiralty
seizures and deodand forfeitures were different types of actions under the English common
law, see supra note 11, both employ the idea that objects can be guilty of a crime and therefore
can be linked for the purposes of this analysis.
182. For a more complete discussion of these animal trials, see generally Paul Schiff
Berman, Rats, Pigs, and Statues on Trial: The Creation of Cultural Narratives in the Prosecution
of Animals and Inanimate Objects, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 288 (1994).
183. See, e.g., id. at 299-300 (describing the confinement of an animal in a human prison in
the town of Pont de Larche).
184. See, e.g., EVANS, supra note 13, at 38 (noting the appointment of a defense lawyer for
a group of insects in a 1545 trial).
185. Id. at 153-54.
186. See id. at 150.
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her habits of life a most honest creature.”187 This document seems to
have had a decisive influence upon the judgment of the court.188
If the animal were found guilty, it was executed. Even the customs
for punishment were the same for animals and human beings. The
usual method was hanging, although there are also recorded
instances of animals being burnt at the stake or buried alive.189
Sometimes the animal was actually dragged through the streets, as
was the practice with a human criminal.190 If it managed to escape, an
effigy was burned, again mirroring the treatment of human
defendants.191 Animals were even put in the rack prior to the
execution in order to extort confessions.192 “It is not to be supposed
that, in such cases, the judge had the slightest expectation that any
confession would be made; he wished merely to observe all forms
prescribed by the law, and to set in motion the whole machinery of
justice before pronouncing judgment.”193
In contrast to the murder and bestiality cases, many other trials of
animals involved large groups of pests that caused hardship
throughout the community or created a public nuisance. In these
instances there was neither a single victim nor one animal to hold
responsible, and the entire rural commune prosecuted the case.194
Because no individual could be punished, these trials often ended
with an ecclesiastical tribunal placing anathemas195 and
excommunications on the guilty parties. Again, advocates were hired
to represent the animals, and the trials often dragged over long
periods of time as defense counsel raised numerous objections
ranging from a claim of insufficient notice196 to the argument that the
animals were simply obeying God’s command to seek sustenance on
Earth, thereby immunizing them from human punishment.197
Although some commentators have attempted to justify the
practice of trying inanimate objects and animals as a form of
punishment for negligent owners,198 the proceedings themselves refer
187. Id.
188. See id. at 150-51.
189. See id. at 147.
190. See COHEN, supra note 117, at 113.
191. See id.
192. See EVANS, supra note 13, at 139.
193. Id.
194. For an example of such a proceeding, see Berman, supra note 182, at 310-13.
195. Anathemas were formal ecclesiastical curses, usually accompanied by
excommunication. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 78 (1986).
196. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 182, at 289.
197. See, e.g., id. at 311.
198. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 144, at *301 (“[Some deodands are] grounded
upon this additional reason, that such misfortunes are in part owing to the negligence of the
owner, and therefore he is properly punished for such forfeiture.”); 1 HALE, supra note 161, at
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repeatedly to the offending agent as the guilty party and nowhere
adopt a narrative invoking negligence principles. To the contrary,
one court observer during the reign of Henry VIII stated: “Where a
man killeth another with the sword of John at Stile, the sword shall
be forfeit as deodand, and yet no default is in the owner.”199
Indeed, the prosecution of the guilty object sometimes substituted
for any criminal action against the human malefactor.200 Thus, it was
said that “[i]f a man by misadventure is crushed or drowned or
otherwise slain, let hue and cry at once be raised; but in such a case
there is no need to make pursuit from field to field and vill to vill; for
the malefactor has been caught, to wit, the bane [the slaying
object].”201 Even on those occasions when a human being was tried
for murder, the forfeiture of the object that caused the death was a
separate part of the proceedings.202
Oliver Wendell Holmes, in his noted survey of the common law,
observed that the deodand actions were not based on the fault of the
owner. Holmes pointed out that, if they had been, then the forfeiture
would be pursued against the individual who was the owner at the
time the object or animal did the harm. However, that was not the
case. Rather, “[t]he action followed the guilty thing into whosoever
hands it came.”203 Thus, if an animal had been sold to a new owner by
the time the action was brought, the new owner still lost possession
of the transgressing beast, despite having no possible responsibility
at the time of the transgression.204 Likewise, an object could be
forfeitable even if it were the property of the person who had died.205
424 (“The notion upon which deodands have been principally levied in our own times, and
which appears indeed to have been always considered as, partly, the reason of the law, has
been that they operate as a sort of penalty on carelessness, tending to make the owners of
chattels of a dangerous character, more cautious in using them.”).
199. Quoted in HOLMES, supra note 11, at 23 (citing “a book written in the reign of Henry
VIII, about 1530”); see also MORRIS, supra note 154, at 229 (recounting a 1680 forfeiture of a
horse that killed a person despite the owner’s claim that he did not know the horse was “ill
Condicioned”).
200. While it is certainly true that an action against a guilty object or animal might
therefore function as a substitute punishment for the owner, the important point is that the two
guilts were conceptualized as distinct from each other. Moreover, as discussed infra, had the
forfeiture been treated solely as punishment against a negligent owner, then forfeiture would
have been pursued against the individual who was the owner at the time the object or animal
caused the harm. However, as Oliver Wendell Holmes has noted, that was not the case. See
HOLMES, supra note 11, at 11.
201. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 157, at 473.
202. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 144, at *301 (“[I]n all indictments for homicide, the
instrument of death and the value are presented and found by the grand jury . . . that the king
or his grantee may claim the deodand . . . .”).
203. HOLMES, supra note 11, at 11.
204. See id. at 24. This idea still survives in the “relation back” doctrine in modern civil
forfeiture, whereby the government’s right to the property is deemed to arise at the time of the
illegal use. The “relation back” doctrine, as in Holmes’s examples, requires forfeiture even if
the object were subsequently sold to a new owner. See LEVY, supra note 3, at 105.
205. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 157, at 474; see also Karraker, supra note
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Proceedings against animals and inanimate objects appear to have
continued into the modern era. When the British finally abolished
deodands in 1846,206 one member of Parliament remarked that the
law of deodands was still being “called into action weekly.”207
Moreover, just as the movement to abolish deodands was gathering
momentum in England,208 the Supreme Court of the United States, in
The Palmyra209 and Harmony,210 adopted the concept of finding
objects guilty,211 thereby insuring that the tradition would endure.
And sociologist E.P. Evans, who has gathered the most complete
listing of animal trials to date, cites over two hundred cases occurring
between 824, when moles were tried in the valley of Aosta,212 and
1906, the year of his writing, when a dog was sentenced to death in
Switzerland.213 As recently as 1994, the Governor of New Jersey
banished from the state a dog that had bitten a person, ending the
dog’s three-year incarceration on death row.214
III. FORFEITURE’S SYMBOLIC NARRATIVE AND CURRENT
FORFEITURE DOCTRINE
Philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey wrote that “reality only exists for us
in the facts of consciousness given by inner experience.”215 But for
every experience there is a wide range of possible meanings that can
be assigned.216 And for every possible meaning there are a wide range
of stories one can tell. Thus, the way in which we describe or
conceptualize an experience ultimately creates the meaning we
177, at 714-15 (discussing deodand forfeiture of the chain on which a person hanged himself).
206. For a discussion of the abolition of deodands in England, see Finkelstein, supra note
99, at 170-71.
207. LEVY, supra note 3, at 19.
208. See Finkelstein, supra note 99, at 171-72 (tracing the “crisis” that developed beginning
in the early 19th century regarding an increase in wrongful deaths due to the advent of
stagecoaches and railroads, and arguing that this crisis led to the abolition of deodands).
209. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
210. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
212. Evans identifies place names by province or town, presumably based on the name
listed in the actual court records. Since some of these towns may no longer exist or may have
changed names, it is often difficult even to identify the present-day country that corresponds to
Evans’s appellations.
213. See EVANS, supra note 13, at 265-86 (listing proceedings).
214. See Robert Hanley, Taro Leaves Death Row, Jail, and New Jersey Soil, for Good, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1994, at B4; see also Jeff Stryker, The Dog Walks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1994, at
A21 (comparing the case to medieval animal trials). Although the dog was never formally
charged with a crime or put on trial, the banishment mirrors the Greek custom of exiling guilty
objects beyond the boundaries of Athens.
215. WILHELM DILTHEY: SELECTED WRITINGS 161 (H.P. Rickman ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1976).
216. See KERTZER, supra note 15, at 3-4 (“Human reality is not provided at birth by the
physical universe, but rather must be fashioned by individuals out of the culture into which
they are born.”).
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discover in that experience.217 “All we . . . have to work with is the
presentation of events in the vehicle of narrative discourse.”218
Therefore, “our understanding of events as they happened out there,
in the world, is an inference we make, a normalized chronology and
causality we intuit from what the narrative tells us.”219
If legal proceedings function, at least in part, as cultural
storytellers, then it is essential not only to explain the rationale
behind a given legal proceeding, but also to take seriously the way in
which the proceeding constructs reality through its narrative.220
Unfortunately, from the beginning, commentators have ignored the
narrative constructed by trials of non-human transgressors. These
commentators have rejected the idea put forward in the trials that
inanimate objects and animals could indeed be considered guilty of
crimes and have instead sought more “rational” explanations for the
longevity of the practice. This Part begins with a brief survey of these
purported rationales and argues that, although the various
justifications may well have some validity, they are necessarily
incomplete because they require the commentator to discount the
language of the proceedings themselves.
Thus, instead of viewing these trials as built on a legal fiction, we
must consider the idea that the object or animal was actually
conceived of as a guilty party. Accordingly, this Part discusses these
trials as “status degradation ceremonies” that served to reinforce the
communal order by casting out a transgressor. In this view, the nonhuman instrument of death or destruction is considered to be tainted
by the incident and is therefore symbolically forfeited in an action
independent of any proceeding against a culpable human being.
Finally, this Part returns to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bennis
and Ursery to see whether any aspect of this narrative survives in
contemporary American forfeiture doctrine.

217. See Edward M. Bruner, Experience and its Expressions, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
EXPERIENCE, supra note 14, at 3, 7-12.
218. Brooks, supra note 14, at 17.
219. Id.; see also DAVID CARR, TIME, NARRATIVE, AND HISTORY 57-72 (1986) (arguing
that narrative is not something we impose onto the events and phenomena we experience, but
is rather the way we experience those events and phenomena).
220. Indeed, Lawrence Lessig goes so far as to claim that social meanings so construct the
dominant reality of a society that they are “in an important sense nonoptional. They empower
or constrain individuals, whether or not the individual chooses the power or constraints.”
Lessig, supra note 109, at 955. While such a formulation may over-emphasize somewhat the
powerlessness of individuals to forge new social constructions of reality, there can be no doubt
that narratives, or social meanings, are “forces to be reckoned with, by the weakest as well as
the strong.” Id. (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
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A. Explanations and Justifications for Legal Proceedings Against
Inanimate Objects and Animals
From the outset, scholarly criticism accompanied the practice of
trying inanimate objects and animals. The earliest commentary on
animal trials in Europe is found in a treatise by Philippe de
Beaumanoir from 1283.221 Beaumanoir condemned the practice as
juridically meaningless and invalid, because he believed that all
crime presupposes intent, and beasts possessing neither knowledge
of good and evil nor malicious intentions could not be held
responsible for their actions.222
This argument was a recapitulation of positions taken by other
critics. Earlier in the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas, in his
Summa Theologiae, questioned whether it was even permissible to
curse irrational creatures.223 He argued that curses and blessings
could only be pronounced on beings capable of receiving evil or
good impressions from them, and so such spells should be aimed
only at rational and sentient beings.224 Because animals were devoid
of understanding, they could not, in Aquinas’s view, commit a
wrong.225 Although he acknowledged the existence of Biblical spells
visited upon non-rational beings, Aquinas explained that these
curses were actually aimed at human beings who would be directly
affected.226 For example, when God cursed the earth, the true targets
were human beings who would be punished by its sterility.227 Aquinas
concluded that, if animals are regarded as creatures coming from the
hand of God and employed by Him as agents for the execution of
His judgments, then cursing them constitutes blasphemy.228 On the
other hand, if animals are treated as lesser, non-rational creatures,
then cursing them is “idle and vain and consequently unlawful.”229
Most ecclesiastical opinion agreed with Aquinas. If animals were
ravaging the communities, it must be the devil’s work, and so the
proper course of action was for the people to repent their sins rather
221. See BEAUMANOIR, supra note 16; see generally ADHEMAR ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF
CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 611 (John Simpson trans., Little, Brown 1913) (finding
Beaumanoir’s work valuable for acquainting readers with the legal institutions of the period);
O.F. ROBINSON ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 335 (1985)
(describing Beaumanoir’s Coutumes as one of the important unofficial compilations of
territorial customs in areas of France).
222. See BEAUMANOIR, supra note 16, at § 1944.
223. See 3 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 1505 (2a-2æ, q. 76) (Fathers of
the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1948).
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. Id.
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than put the animals on trial.230 Indeed, defense counsel at many of
these trials argued that, because the pests clearly were sent to punish
sinful human beings, they should be regarded as agents of God,
making it useless and indeed blasphemous to prosecute them.
Instead, repentance would be the only effective means of combating
the beasts, for only then might God remove the scourge.231
The evidence indicates, however, that this argument rarely
prevailed at trial. Instead, the validity of animal prosecutions was
upheld, and the trials were combined with various rites of religious
purification. Thus, prior to any trial that might involve an exorcism,
the entire commune formed processions of prayer and repentance. It
was only if these religious means failed that the trial could begin.232
These activities might seem to indicate that animals were punished
because they were seen as the embodiment of Satan. However, the
sentences against the animal pests usually stated only that the
animals were harming human beings, not that they were agents of
the devil.233 Even the precedents cited were invariably curses of
earthly animal nuisances, with no mention of any supernatural
element at work.234
The English law of the deodand also faced strong criticism. As
early as the thirteenth century, Henry de Bracton, in his discussion of
the laws of England, opined that the deodand practice was
unreasonable.235 Pollock and Maitland attributed the proceedings
against inanimate objects to “that unreasoning instinct that impels
the civilised man to kick, or consign to eternal perdition, the chair
over which he has stumbled.”236 Similarly, other critics dismissed the
proceedings as the product of “the animism of primitive man.”237
According to this theory, human beings erroneously endowed
objects with both a soul and human (or superhuman) mental
facilities.238 However, as discussed in Part II, the common law of the
deodand developed from the Biblical command regarding the goring
ox and the Gothic tradition of “noxal surrender,” whereby the kin of
the deceased took vengeance on a symbolic object rather than
perpetuate a blood feud. Neither of these sources appears to rely on
230. See COHEN, supra note 117, at 126.
231. See EVANS, supra note 13, at 52-53.
232. See COHEN, supra note 117, at 131 (describing instructions from the bishop of Autun
to parishioners regarding rituals to be performed in connection with a trial of snails).
233. See id. at 130.
234. See id.
235. See 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 147, at 259.
236. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 157, at 474.
237. Finkelstein, supra note 121, at 48 (quoting HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF
LAW AND STATE 3-4 (Anders Wedberg trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1945)).
238. See id.
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the notion that the object or animal acted with some kind of guilty
intent, as a human being might. Thus, animism is, at best, an
incomplete explanation.
Blackstone, while dismissing the “superstitious” origins of
deodands as derived from “the blind days of popery,” nevertheless
attempted to justify the practice on the ground that it helped to deter
negligence.239 Under this theory, misfortunes leading to accidental
death were partly the result of “the negligence of the owner” of the
property, “and, therefore, he is properly punished by such
forfeiture.”240 Hale similarly expressed the idea that forfeiture of the
deodand induced better care.241 While this justification continues to
resonate in some of the modern Supreme Court forfeiture
opinions,242 it too provides only a partial account, for, as Holmes
pointed out, if the object or animal had been sold prior to forfeiture,
the new owner would suffer the loss, not the allegedly culpable
owner.243 In addition, even objects owned by the victim were
sometimes considered deodand.244
The Supreme Court has, on occasion, offered one further
justification for the forfeiture tradition. In certain circumstances it is
very difficult both to track down the owner of an object that has
caused harm and to determine whether the owner actually knew
about the illegal activity. Thus, by proceeding against the object in
rem, the government is spared the difficulty of finding the owner or
proving the owner’s guilt.245 Although this justification may or may
239. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 144, at *300-01.
240. Id. at *301. Even Blackstone recognized, however, that the object itself was
considered “an accursed thing,” thereby suggesting that, through forfeiture, the object was
purified and lost its taint.
241. See 1 HALE, supra note 161, at 424 (“The notion upon which deodands have
principally been levied in our own times, and which appears indeed, to have been always
considered as, partly, the reason of the law, has been that they operate as a sort of penalty on
carelessness, tending to make the owners of chattels of a dangerous character, more cautious in
using them.”).
242. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing, 416 U.S. 663, 685-86 (1974)
(quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1921) (“[S]ome
forms of property are facilities, and therefore . . . Congress interposes the care and
responsibility of their owners in aid of the prohibitions of the law and its punitive provisions,
by ascribing to the property a certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the
wrong.”).
243. See HOLMES, supra note 11, at 11; see also id. at 23-24 (“[I]t has been repeated from
Queen Elizabeth’s time to within one hundred years, that if my horse strikes a man, and
afterwards I sell my horse, and after that the man dies, the horse shall be forfeited.” (footnotes
omitted)).
244. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 157, at 474.
245. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 472 (1996) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he necessity of finding some source of compensation for injuries done by a vessel whose
responsible owners were often half a world away and beyond the practical reach of the law and
its processes . . . . and the impracticality of adjudicating the innocence of the owners or their
good-faith efforts in finding a diligent and trustworthy master, combined to eliminate the
owner’s lack of culpability as a defense.”); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1926)
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not be sensible as a policy matter, it is, like the negligence theory, an
inadequate description of the history of deodands. There is no
indication that these proceedings were conceived as a form of strict
liability penalty for particularly dangerous items. Moreover, this
theory still does not explain why an object causing harm to its owner
would nevertheless be considered a deodand.
Finally, modern critics have pointed out that deodands provided a
source of income to the king and his feudal lords, explaining the
longevity of the practice on economic grounds.246 However, as
historian Esther Cohen points out, killing an animal often deprived
the king and the feudal lords of revenue.247 It is difficult to see the
economic benefit to be gained from the forfeiture of a wheel or a
tree branch or a clod of dirt. Similarly, in Bennis, the seizure of the
car was not an economic benefit for the government. Indeed, the
trial court found that there were no net proceeds from the sale of the
car.248 More importantly, even if the ultimate longevity of the practice
is explicable partially on economic terms, the particular language
used to conceptualize the proceeding is not. Thus, it may be less
important to explain why the practice survived than to examine the
narrative of guilt that surrounded the practice and the social
meaning that this narrative created.
Indeed, although all of these varied theories about the trials of
inanimate objects and animals undoubtedly have some explanatory
value, none provides a completely satisfactory account of the
practice because none attempts to understand the trials on their own
(“The law . . . precludes evasions by dispensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry as to
collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner.”); Harmony v. United
States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844) (forfeiture applies “without any regard whatsoever to
the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner thereof. And this is done from the
necessity of the case, as the only adequate means of suppressing the offense or wrong, or
insuring an indemnity to the injured party.”).
246. See, e.g., Finkelstein, supra note 99, at 182. Nevertheless, even Finkelstein
acknowledges that “a notion of [guilt] might have played some role in the development of the
institution.” Finkelstein, supra note 121, at 74. Hyde rejects economics as the primary
motivation for the practice, arguing that the real object of the deodand was to atone for
manslaughter in accordance with medieval concepts of justice. See Hyde, supra note 124, at
728.
247. See COHEN, supra note 117, at 115:
The execution of an animal was just as expensive as that of a man, especially in small
jurisdictions requiring the services of [a] hangman from another town. The hangman’s
travel and time costs in such a case would also have been charged to the judicial
authority. While the beast’s owner lost, the lord stood to gain no material profits.
248. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 445. According to the District Attorney in the case:
[T]he charge to tow a vehicle off the street was $75 and to store it was $8 per day. The
state of Michigan charged $11 to transfer title to a buyer at auction. The salvage company
charged $60 to hold the auction. Forty-three days had already elapsed by the entry of the
trial court’s order. Given these unit costs, the trial judge properly estimated expenses in
the Bennis case to be in excess of the car’s value.
George E. Ward, Bennis and the War Against Drugs, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 109, 114-15 (1996)
(footnotes omitted).
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terms. After all, these proceedings were public spectacles, conducted
with the active participation of the community.249 The trials not only
adjudicated conflicts but also constructed a way of understanding
and coming to terms with grave misfortunes or freak accidents. Thus,
even if one or a combination of the theories described above
explains why these trials persisted, those theories do not help us to
see the possible cultural significance embedded in the narrative of
guilt that the trials constructed.
B. Narratives of Degradation
Most modern writers who have discussed the social function of
trials have emphasized the courts’ chief role as dispute resolvers.250
However, it is important to see that trials also function as cultural
storytellers and that legal processes provide narratives that permit
the community to respond to the breach of a social norm.251 Thus,
trials not only redress the harm to a community by punishing a guilty
individual; they also “perform the laws”252 so that the community can
reenact a sense of its own order and redraw its boundaries. The
tainted transgressor is therefore reduced in status, reclassified as an
“other,” and symbolically removed from the polity.
Social scientist Harold Garfinkel has called this type of ritual a
“status degradation ceremony,” defined as “[a]ny communicative
work between persons, whereby the public identity of an actor is
transformed into something looked on as lower in the local scheme
of social types.”253 According to Garfinkel, the act of expressing
249. See COHEN, supra note 117, at 74:
[T]he public watching legal rituals was, despite its ostensible passivity, perhaps the most
important element in the entire picture. Unless the spectacle spoke the language of the
audience, used its symbols and cultural perceptions, the entire purpose of the exercise
was lost. The judge in his gallery viewing a stage set at his orders and the spectator in the
crowd looking, jostling and being jostled, shouting assent or dissent, were both
participants in the legal drama.
250. See, e.g., THEODORE BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLITICS: THE POLITICAL
FUNCTIONINGS OF COURTS 26 (1970) (viewing disputes as the justification and focus of court
work and therefore stressing impartiality as “the heart of the judicial process”); DISPUTES AND
THE LAW (M. Cain & K. Kulcsar eds., 1983) (arguing that the more complex the society, the
greater the need for disputes to have institutionalized resolutions according to legal patterns);
J.A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY 220 (1981) (discussing British courts as
fora for resolving political controversies); Richard L. Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute
Institutions in Society, 8 L. & SOC’Y REV. 217 (1973) (describing courts as primarily disputeresolving institutions); M. Cain & K. Kulcsar, Thinking Disputes: An Essay on the Origins of
the Dispute Industry, 16 L. & SOC’Y REV. 375 (1982) (arguing that any general theory about
disputes should begin with the presumption that courts should settle disputes); Simon Roberts,
The Study of Dispute: Anthropological Perspectives, in DISPUTES AND SETTLEMENTS 1 (John
Bossy ed., 1983) (discussing different ways dispute-resolving institutions intervene in quarrels).
251. See Berman, supra note 182, at 314 (describing trials as “performative rituals that
allow a community to respond to the breach of a social norm”).
252. Hariman, supra note 111.
253. Garfinkel, supra note 118, at 420.
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moral indignation towards a transgressor of the established order
reinforces group solidarity. Indeed, he describes a degradation
ceremony as “a secular form of communion.”254
A degradation ceremony can be particularly useful in cases where
the transgressor is not a human being. When statues fall from the sky
or pigs kill a small child or the branch of a tree crushes someone,
there is a sense of disorder and irrationality that the society’s
institutions must address: “Such random acts of violence caused by
insensate agents bring a deep feeling of lawlessness: not so much the
fear of laws being broken, but the far worse fear that the world might
not be a lawful place at all.”255 By permitting the community to
reaffirm its boundaries and reestablish its solidarity, a status
degradation ceremony helps to impose order on a world of random
violence. And while it is unclear whether communities considered
the guilty animals or inanimate objects actually to have lost status as
a result of legal proceedings against them, it is significant that these
proceedings mirrored the trials of human perpetrators and relied on
the same ritualized forms of justice. Therefore, the form of the status
degradation ceremony, with its focus on community purification, was
retained.
The legal proceedings against inanimate objects and animals
discussed in Part II thus can be understood as status degradation
ceremonies that helped to heal the community in at least two ways.
First, the trials asserted the moral order of the community by
defining the offending animal or object as guilty of a crime. Then,
the proceedings performed an act of purification by removing the
transgressor from the community, either through banishment,
forfeiture, excommunication, or execution. And although action
might also be taken against a human agent involved in the killing,
such action was seen as entirely distinct from the proceedings against
the non-human agent. As in the forfeiture of the sword owned by
John at Stile,256 the blight on the community included both the agent
of lawlessness and the symbolic object.
C. Symbolic Forfeiture and the Supreme Court
To many observers, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bennis v.
Michigan was both irrational and inexplicable. Indeed, the holding
unleashed a torrent of media criticism,257 and law review articles as
254. Id. at 421.
255. Humphrey, supra note 13, at xix.
256. See supra text accompanying note 199.
257. See, e.g., Robin E. Blumner, Perspective, Moving One Step Closer to a Police State, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 17, 1996, at 4D; Editorial, Government’s Grand Seizures, DET.
NEWS, Mar. 13, 1996, at 8A; Richard Grossman, As a Matter of Law Seizure Ruling Belongs in
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well have been largely negative.258 Most commentators have focused
on the Court’s indifference to the impact that its opinion would have
on innocent third parties. One writer contended that “the seizure of
a woman’s car because of her husband’s one-time peccadillo sounds
excessive to me. And not just excessive: cruel, unusual, and damned
embarrassing besides.”259 Another editorialist excoriated the Court
for sanctioning the practice of “steal[ing] property from innocent
people.”260 The New York Times and The Washington Post agreed
that the decision violated elementary notions of “fairness.”261
For some, “the most surprising thing about the Bennis decision was
Justice Ginsburg’s vote.”262 Because she is considered part of the
Court’s so-called “liberal wing,” it was widely expected that she
would side with Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, all of whom
dissented (along with Justice Kennedy). Instead, Justice Ginsburg
joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court—along with
Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas—and helped to tip the scales
against Tina Bennis, by a margin of five to four. Her vote prompted
19th Century, POST STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Mar. 11, 1996, at A8; Charles Levendosky,
High Court Takes Low Road on Forfeiture, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 14, 1996, at 15A;
Nasty Attack of Seizure, TIME, Mar. 18, 1996, at 80; Nation’s Founders Would Gasp at Court’s
Stance, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 1996, at 10A; Matthew J. Norem, Letter to the Editor, Supreme
Court Makes Big Blunder, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 19, 1996, at 9; Debra J. Saunders, A
Convoluted Court Ruling: Is Fairness Totally Disconnected from the Law?, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Mar. 13, 1996, at A18; Debra Saunders, High Court Takes Low Road on Forfeiture,
DET. FREE PRESS, Mar. 13, 1996, at 9A; Savage, supra note 21, at 47; Michele Stevens, Take It
From Him: Seizure Laws a Bad Deal, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 25, 1996, at 29 (“Tina Bennis
thought common sense would prevail . . . . She was wrong.”); Carle Gray Sullivan, Innocent
Punished, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Mar. 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws
File (“[S]imple equity/justice would dictate that the court [sic] should have refrained from
punishing the innocent victim, Tina Bennis”); George E. Ward, Letter to the Editor, Checkout
Time for Balancing the Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1996, at A18; George Will, High Court
Deals a Setback to Property Rights, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 10, 1996, at 40 (“Tina Bennis . . .
found out the hard way: that our government only gives lip service to the rights of innocent
victims.”). But see It’s a Legislative Job, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Mar. 15, 1996, at B6 (arguing
that the Court in Bennis properly applied its precedent and that protection for “innocent
owners” should be supplied by legislation, rather than court decisions).
258. See, e.g., Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 11, at 593; Dery, supra note 104, at 359;
Luna, supra note 100, at 409; Sandra Guerra, Family Values?: The Family As an Innocent
Victim of Civil Drug Asset Forfeiture, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 343, 366-68 (1996). But see
Deborah Jones Merritt, Forfeiture and Real Feminism, LEGAL TIMES, July 29, 1996, at S35;
Seamon, supra note 102, at 389; Ward, supra note 248.
259. James J. Kilpatrick, From Piracy to Prostitution in the Courts, BUFF. NEWS, Mar. 18,
1996, at 3B.
260. Levendosky, supra note 257, at 15A.
261. His Crime, Her Car, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1996, at A23; Forfeiting Fairness, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at A30.
262. Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Car Is Not a Pirate Ship, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at 21; see
also William E. Hellerstein, It Was a Very Good Year—For the Government: The Supreme
Court’s Major Criminal Rulings of the 1995-1996 Term, 13 TOURO L. REV. 395, 400 (1997)
(“The most startling aspect of Bennis is that it was Justice Ginsburg’s vote that sank Mrs.
Bennis.”); Forfeiting Fairness, supra note 261, at A30 (“[F]or reasons that are not clear in her
skimpy concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg ended up voting with the majority to uphold the
forfeiture . . . .”).
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an angry reaction from Stefan B. Herpel, the lawyer who
represented Tina Bennis: “I think it’s an outrageous decision, and
I’m shocked and mystified by Justice Ginsburg.”263
Nevertheless, the history of proceedings against inanimate objects
and animals may shed some light on both the Court’s opinion and
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence. As in those proceedings, John
Bennis’s 1977 Pontiac can be seen as a symbol of the breakdown of
the community’s moral order. Thus, perhaps it is not so surprising
that the authorities might wish to remove the object itself in addition
to sanctioning the guilty individual, or that forfeiture law might
permit such a symbolic “banishment.”
Indeed, the Bennis case arose from a Detroit anti-prostitution
campaign called “Operation Save Our Neighborhood,” which was
created specifically in response to a demand by residents of north
central Detroit for relief from the blighting effects of vice.264 At trial,
the judge referred to testimony from neighborhood residents
attesting to the scourge of prostitution in the area.265 For example,
the judge described one resident who “has had to . . . put up with the
acts and frustrations of those engaging in some forms of
[prostitution] activity in front of her home” at all times of the day
and night, 365 days a year.266 According to the judge, “[she] cannot
even walk along Eight Mile Road now; . . . even when she wants to
go for a little walk in the morning, she has to have her husband
trailing behind her . . . .”267 Another witness complained that his
young son had seen acts of prostitution in cars parked near the very
corner John Bennis chose.268
In such a blighted neighborhood, the cars themselves, driven by
various men cruising the streets soliciting prostitutes, are one of the
most visible symbols of the breakdown of order.269 Indeed, according
to the Wayne County prosecutor, “[o]ver sixty percent of the ‘johns’
263. Savage, supra note 21, at 48.
264. See Ward, supra note 248, at 113.
265. See Transcript of Bench Ruling of Trial Court at 181-86, reprinted in J.A. at 15-19,
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
266. Id. at 184, reprinted in J.A. at 18.
267. Id.
268. See Michigan v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 491 (Mich. 1994).
269. Similarly, other cities have attempted to crack down on so-called “quality of life”
offenses in part because of the symbolic value of ridding the community of such activities. See,
e.g., Inside Politics (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 3, 1997) (“[New York City] Mayor
[Rudolph] Giuliani tried a new approach to crime, . . . a crackdown on so-called ‘quality of life
crimes’ like graffiti and vagrancy to convince New Yorkers things had changed and the city was
in control.”); see also Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA.
L. REV. 349, 351 (1997) (“Cracking down on aggressive panhandling, prostitution, open gang
activity and other visible signs of disorder may be justifiable . . . since disorderly behavior and
the law’s response to it are cues about the community’s attitude toward more serious forms of
criminal wrongdoing.”).
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and other customers of vice markets operating in Detroit are nonresidents, and over ninety percent are non-residents of the particular
neighborhood suffering the unpleasantness.”270 As the Michigan
Supreme Court held, “[w]here testimony surrounding proof of an
incident of prostitution unequivocally establishes that the
neighborhood has a reputation for prostitution, the property
contributing to the continuance of the nuisance may be abated
pursuant to the statute. To hold otherwise . . . would permit the
continuing blight of neighborhoods.”271
For a community that has witnessed the collapse of its order, the
cars themselves might be seen as symbolically guilty. Accordingly,
the Save Our Neighborhood initiative attempted to restore
equilibrium to the neighborhood in part by seizing the “tainted”
automobiles and “banishing” them through forfeiture. Although the
forfeitures also undoubtedly have a deterrent effect, it is important
to note that, in this case at least, John Bennis was prosecuted for
indecency, and the legislature could easily have imposed an
additional fine or otherwise increased the punishment for such a
crime. However, additional punishment aimed at the human
transgressor would not have the same symbolic value as the act of
seizing the car itself. Moreover, it is difficult to see what deterrent
effect the seizure could have had on Tina Bennis, who admittedly
was powerless to prevent her husband from using their jointly owned
car.272
Thus, while both the majority opinion and Justice Ginsburg’s
concurrence speak of “deterrence,” these references seem to be
focused not so much on deterring specific individuals, but on
deterring criminal activity in the larger sense by ridding the
community of the instrumentality and symbol of vice. Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court concludes that “[t]he Bennis
automobile . . . facilitated and was used in criminal activity,” and
observes that the activity in question “contributes to neighborhood
deterioration and unsafe streets.”273 And Justice Ginsburg’s
concurrence, so surprising to Court observers, explicitly rejected the
dissent’s contention that the government had “embarked on an
experiment to punish innocent third parties.”274 Instead, she stated

270. Ward, supra note 248, at 111 n.22; see also Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 491 (“Vehicles that
enter the neighborhood in order to solicit acts of prostitution are being used for the
continuance of this nuisance.”).
271. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 492.
272. As Justice Ginsburg asked at oral argument, “What was [Tina Bennis] supposed to
do?” Tr. of Oral Argument 59, Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
273. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453 (1996).
274. Id. at 458 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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simply that “Michigan has decided to deter Johns from using cars
they own (or co-own) to contribute to neighborhood blight, and that
abatement endeavor hardly warrants this Court’s disapprobation.”275
Such statements may seem manifestly unfair when viewed from the
perspective of Tina Bennis’s moral culpability. But when considered
in light of the centuries-old tradition of banishing objects and
animals to preserve the community’s order, these conclusions may be
more intelligible.
Similarly, many commentators criticized United States v. Ursery
because they saw the civil forfeitures at issue as a second punishment
heaped upon the owners.276 But again, if one views this decision in
light of forfeiture history, the result may not be as surprising. After
all, actions against the object or animal have always been viewed as
separate from the prosecution of a culpable individual.
Moreover, as we can see from Bennis itself, the seizure of an object
may well serve separate societal values from the punishment of the
individual. For example, in 1996 a homeless man living in an
impoverished neighborhood in West Palm Beach, Florida, burned
down an abandoned “crack house” in what he described as an effort
to save a blighted community.277 Significantly, the man, Samuel
Mohammed, did not direct his wrath at the individuals who had
perpetrated drug deals at the crack house. In fact, he stated that he
did not bear any malice towards the individual dealers, users, and
prostitutes in the neighborhood.278 Rather, he was concerned with
rescuing a community “on the verge of self-destruction.”279 Thus, it is
perhaps not surprising that Mohammed moved against the house
itself, the symbol of a neighborhood that had been laid waste by gang
warfare, violence, and poverty.280 And for that action, many
recognized Mohammed as a hero; although he was charged with
arson, he was ultimately acquitted by a jury.281
The Ursery Court appeared to recognize that forfeiture serves a
societal value wholly separate from the punishment of a culpable
individual. The majority opinion refers to in rem forfeitures as
“remedial” actions brought by the State and distinguishes these

275. Id.
276. See, e.g., Rachel L. Brand, Civil Forfeiture as Jeopardy, 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
292 (1996).
277. See Kate Santich, Cleansed By Fire, THE ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 3, 1996, at 6.
278. See Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Aug. 7, 1996), transcript available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File, at 7.
279. Tom Knott, Florida City’s Drug-War Hero Got a Raw Deal, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 1,
1996, at C2.
280. See Santich, supra note 277, at 6.
281. See id.
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actions from punitive in personam penalties.282 The distinction is
significant, because while a punitive penalty, by definition, focuses
on punishment of an individual transgressor, a remedial action is
brought against the object not as punishment, but as remedy for the
harm suffered by the community as a whole.
This conception echoes the deodand tradition and its use of
forfeiture as a means of preserving “the King’s peace,” rather than
either punishing the owner or offering redress to a private party.
Indeed, because deodands were considered a public remedial action
that made the community whole after a wrongful death, it is not
surprising that the English Parliament established a private wrongful
death action at the same time that it abolished deodands.283 The
forfeiture action had previously been deemed to supersede the
system of private retributive justice because the party to be made
whole was the community.284
Thus, Ursery, despite its absence of any explanatory rationale, can
be understood to endorse the notion that forfeiture is a remedial
action against an object to make the community whole rather than a
punishment directed at an individual. Like the javelin that
accidentally kills a boy, or the mill wheel that grinds a person to
death, the object may become a tainted symbol of the wrongdoing,
and the community may seek forfeiture to remedy the breach of the
social norm and restore the society’s equilibrium.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is always possible, of course, to jettison history. Numerous legal
practices with long historical pedigrees have fallen into disfavor
because they no longer accord with contemporary notions of justice.
The prosecution of legal actions against inanimate objects may be
one such practice that has outlived its rationale. As stated at the
outset, this Article takes no normative position on this question or
on the wisdom or efficacy of modern forfeiture law generally.
However, it will not do for those who support the status quo
simply to invoke the long tradition of the deodand as if history alone
could justify contemporary legal doctrine. Conversely, critics of
282. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 278 (1996); see also United States v.
Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2035 (1998) (“Traditional in rem forfeitures were . . . not
considered punishment against the individual for an offense.”).
283. See Finkelstein, supra note 99, at 170-71 (“[T]he abolition of the deodands went hand
in hand with the passage of the first ‘Act for Compensating Families of Persons Killed by
Accidents’ . . . which took effect only a few days later . . . .”).
284. See LEVY, supra note 3, at 18 (“[F]orfeiture to the crown of the offender’s property
rendered wholly futile any civil action for damages. . . . In short, death, by converting a private
wrong into a public one redressable by forfeiture, had the effect of barring civil redress for the
tort, that is, the wrong that caused the death.”).
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forfeiture law cannot simply dismiss this history as the irrational
product of a primitive mind. As one commentator has noted, the trial
of an object or animal “was not a game. It was undertaken for the
good of society, and if properly conducted it was intended to bring
social benefits to the community—benefits, that is, to human
beings.”285 Thus, both sides must acknowledge and attempt to
understand the historical practice in its social context.
We can never know for certain why communities conducted legal
actions against inanimate objects and animals. However, we can
attempt to understand the roles such trials may have fulfilled and the
narratives of justice those trials may have constructed. Indeed, this
Article has argued that modern forfeiture law may fulfill similar
roles and construct similar narratives. By analyzing the history of
these seemingly irrational proceedings, we may gain a more nuanced
understanding of current doctrine.
Moreover, once we take seriously the idea that forfeiture actions
exist as much to heal the community as to punish the owner, we are
able to identify various ramifications and avenues for further study.
For example, psychological and sociological research might reveal
whether the removal of a symbol of neighborhood blight (for
example, a car that is recognized in a community as a drug courier
vehicle) actually brings therapeutic benefits over and above the
arrest of the human perpetrators. If so, then discussion of forfeiture
policy could be informed by current scholarship regarding the use of
“social norms”286 to enforce societal order through such practices as
shaming rituals.287 Under this view, we might be concerned that
modern forfeiture practice does not always seem calculated to
achieve a symbolic cleansing or a community catharsis. As we can

285. Humphrey, supra note 13, at xx.
286. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 269, at 362 (“Against the background of [social] norms,
actions become invested with meaning; they signify to others what a person (or community)
believes and cares about.”); Lessig, supra note 109, at 956 (arguing that social meanings “not
only constitute, or guide, or constrain; they are also tools—means to a chosen end, whether an
individually or collectively chosen end. They are a resource—a semiotic resource—that society
provides to all if it provides to any.”); Sunstein, supra note 109, at 911 (“We should try to see
when social norms, social roles, and social meanings are obstacles to human well-being, and
whether something might be done to change them, even if people are making ‘choices,’ even if
there is neither force nor fraud, and whether or not there is ‘harm to others.’”).
287. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591,
630-52 (1996) (discussing the “rediscovery of shame” as a means to enrich “our punitive
vocabulary”); see also Kahan, supra note 269, at 384 (“Shaming penalties—from bumper
stickers for drunk drivers, to publicity for toxic waste dumpers, to signs or distinctive clothing
for sex offenders—are on the rise in American law. Like imprisonment, these punishments
convey condemnation in dramatic and unequivocal terms. They can thus be expected to
‘inspire the public with sentiments of aversion’ toward criminality through their effect on the
forces of social influence.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A.
Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1780))).
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see from the large number of people who turned out to watch as the
contents of O.J. Simpson’s home were carted away,288 there may be a
perceived need for the community actually to participate more
actively in the forfeiture event. Therefore, rather than permitting the
State to sell the Bennis’s car at auction (where, theoretically, a new
person could purchase it and begin cruising the same neighborhood
for prostitutes), perhaps the car should have been given to
neighborhood residents for a ritual destruction, as with the burning
of the abandoned crack house.289 Along the same lines, forfeiture law
might be changed to apply only in those instances when the seizure
of the object truly has symbolic or therapeutic value. Or, in contrast,
we may reject the basic premise that the perceived needs of the
community should be allowed to trump individual civil liberties.290
But these questions cannot be resolved without first taking seriously
the notion that, at least in some situations, forfeiture can have an
independent community value and is not simply an irrational and
unjust practice built on a devious “fiction.”
Finally, this study fits within a broader project whereby
anthropologists and legal scholars have come to realize that law is in
part concerned with the construction of narratives and social
meanings that influence the way a community perceives reality.
Thus, for every legal question, we must study the language being
used to analyze the question, the symbolic content of the
proceedings at issue, and the meaning being created. Such inquiry
permits us to understand the social role that law fulfills for a
community beyond its traditional role in dispute resolution. In the
end we must realize that it is not only so-called “primitive” societies
that create rituals to make sense of the world. We have legal rituals
as well, and the forfeiture of an automobile or a house is not simply a
deterrent legal action; it is a symbolic event. Only by recognizing the
symbolic content of our own rituals of justice can we begin to decide
which legal rules and procedures are truly best.

288. See Rick Orlov, Deputies Seize Items From Home of Simpson, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Mar. 29, 1997, at A1 (“The arrival of the moving vans and deputies triggered a surge of
reporters, helicopters—and sightseers—to the Brentwood community that was beginning to
shake the spotlight.”).
289. This practice would also remove the objection that forfeiture laws only exist to swell
the government’s coffers. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
290. Such a discussion would implicate the more general debate between
communitarianism and liberalism as to the proper balancing of community and individual
interests. See generally LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984).

